「台灣古巴後援會籌備中」,第144期通訊,2009年1月12日。
一、古巴何以重要如昔。(2009.1,每月評論)
Why Cuba
Still Matters
Diana Raby
Monthly Review-January
2009
Diana Raby is senior fellow at the Research Institute
of Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool (UK) and is also professor
emeritus of history at the University
of Toronto . She has written
extensively on Latin America and is also
active in solidarity movements such as the Cuba Solidarity Campaign and the
Venezuela Information Centre (UK). Her latest book, Democracy and Revolution:
Latin America and Socialism Today (London : Pluto
Press, 2006), argues for the crucial importance of Venezuela ,
along with Cuba
and the ALBA countries, in the renewal of the international left in this
century.
In the early 1990s there was near unanimity in the media, in Western
political circles, and even among academics that the collapse of the Cuban
revolution was imminent. Even today, many observers regard it as only a matter
of time for Cuba
to undergo a transition to democracy (understood as a narrowly defined
polyarchy) and a "market economy."
But the fact that Cuban socialism has survived the extraordinary
rigors of the "Special Period" and is still functioning nearly twenty
years after the fall of the Berlin Wall should give pause for thought. Even the
prolonged incapacity of Fidel Castro and his subsequent resignation as
president has not led to chaos or upheaval, as many predicted. Why then has Cuba survived,
and what does it mean for socialist and progressive politics today?
The simple answer is that, for all its problems and deficiencies,
the revolutionary order is still viable. Many Cubans still believe in socialist
principles; they naturally grumble about shortages and restrictions, but have
few illusions about the alternative on offer across the Florida Straits.
But why is this so? What makes Cuba
different from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ?
To understand this it is necessary to go back to the origins of the revolution
and the remarkable transformation that occurred from 1959 to 1963. Before the
revolution, Cuba was a U.S.
protectorate, a vast sugar plantation where venal "democratic"
governments alternated with brutal dictatorships. The idea of a socialist
revolution here—or anywhere else in the U.S.
"backyard" of the Caribbean and Central America —was
unthinkable. So on January 1, 1959, when the dictator Batista fled and the
bearded guerrillas entered Havana and Santiago , almost no one
anticipated the scope and depth of the changes that were to follow.
The Cuban transition to socialism was one of the most rapid and
thorough anywhere in the world: the first and second Agrarian Reform Laws, the
nationalization of virtually all large industries and services, the
extraordinary literacy campaign and the establishment of free public education
at all levels, free universal health care, and the organization of a popular
militia and disciplined mass organizations from neighborhood level upwards, all
in the space of four years or so.
Yet in the first six months of 1959 all the rhetoric was about
democracy and humanism; socialism was scarcely even mentioned until mid-1960,
and was not officially adopted as the goal until April 1961, two years and four
months after the initial victory (during the Bay of Pigs
invasion). The 26th of July Movement (M-26-7) which had led the armed struggle
and seized power was a broad and heterogeneous movement that had serious
differences with what was then Cuba 's
Communist party, the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP). The revolution was
immensely popular, but many observers expected (or feared) that it would
eventually suffer the same fate as Guatemala five years earlier, where the
popular Arbenz government was overthrown by a CIA-sponsored coup.
The tremendous euphoria generated by the revolution in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin
America , and its initial ideological flexibility, are fundamental
for understanding its significance. Taking place in a region and at a time when
U.S. hegemony was undisputed, where the great Mexican revolution had been
neutralized and progressive movements like those of Sandino in Nicaragua, Grau
San Martín in Cuba in 1933, Gaitán in Colombia, and Arbenz in Guatemala had
been crushed by overt or covert U.S. intervention, the Cuban triumph had an
immediate symbolic impact. On his first trip abroad after victory, to Venezuela in
late January 1959, Fidel Castro was received by delirious crowds. In February
the then Chilean Senator Salvador Allende declared that "The Cuban
revolution does not belong only to you...we are dealing with the most
significant movement ever to have occurred in the Americas,"1 and shortly
afterwards Gloria Gaitán, daughter of the assassinated Colombian popular
leader, proclaimed that the Cuban experience was "the beginning of the
great liberation of Nuestra América [Our America]."2 Former president of Mexico , Lázaro Cárdenas, author of the 1938 oil
nationalization in that country, also gave enthusiastic support to Cuba .
The most obvious distinctive feature of the Cuban revolution—and the
essential reason for its ability to avoid the fate of Guatemala, defeating the
counter-revolutionary Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961—was the unprecedented
military victory of the guerrillas of the Rebel Army over the forces of the
dictator Batista. It was also this which would make it possible for Marxists
subsequently to present the process as a textbook case of the Leninist thesis
of armed workers' revolution. But the force that seized power was not a
Communist or Marxist party, it was a broad democratic movement with an eclectic
ideology derived from Cuban and Latin American popular revolutionary traditions
and vague notions of social justice and national liberation. The old Communists
of the PSP, which did have some roots in the labor movement and among
intellectuals but had been compromised by its earlier support for Batista, had
initially condemned Fidel Castro and the guerrillas as "petty-bourgeois
adventurers" and only started supporting the movement on the eve of
victory, late in 1958.
This made it all the more surprising to many observers when the
revolutionary leadership, represented above all by Fidel Castro, pushed ahead
regardless of all obstacles in the initial three years from early 1959 to 1962,
sweeping aside the wealthy Cuban elite and landlord class and defying
Washington to expropriate sugar estates and ranches, nationalize industries,
purge the state apparatus of Batista supporters, sign trade agreements with the
Soviet bloc, and then declare themselves socialist. Was this premeditated
sleight-of-hand by a covert Communist leadership, as alleged by many right-wing
commentators in the United
States ? Or was it the indignant reaction of
popular nationalists when faced with clumsy and uncomprehending U.S. hostility,
as claimed by liberals?
The truth is more complex and more interesting. Having failed to
achieve independence in the early nineteenth century along with most of Spain 's American colonies, Cuba later
developed a powerful liberation movement with a pronounced popular and radical
character. The mambíses, as the popular guerrillas in the thirty-year
insurgency against Spanish rule (1868–98) were known, stressed social and
racial equality and acquired a precocious anti-imperialist as well as
anticolonial consciousness. This was succinctly expressed by the great man of
letters and liberation fighter José Martí when he declared in his last letter
in 1895: "Everything I have done unto now and all that I shall do
hereafter has as its objective to prevent, through the independence of Cuba,
the United States of America from falling with added weight on Our
America."3
This anti-imperialist spirit was expressed again in the struggle
against the dictator Gerardo Machado (1925–33) and the abortive 1933
revolution, which was in many ways a precursor of 1959. Brutal repression
combined with a desperate economic situation caused by the world depression led
to a popular upheaval in which workers seized sugar mills and raised the red
flag, students occupied the presidential palace, and the lower ranks of the
army mutinied and overthrew the officer corps. A provisional government under a
popular medical professor, Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, decreed many progressive
measures including an agrarian reform, intervention (government control) of the
U.S.-owned Cuban Electric Company, a minimum wage, the eight-hour day, and
female suffrage. But this revolutionary government had no organized political
backing, and it soon became clear that the leader of the rebellious troops,
Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, was an opportunist who was willing to work with the
U.S. Embassy.
Under the new administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Washington
had just proclaimed the Good Neighbor Policy and was reluctant to send in the
marines. But with U.S.
warships just off the coast, pressure was exerted on Havana and it came as little surprise when in
January 1934 Grau San Martín was overthrown by Batista who now became the power
behind the throne. The next twenty-five years would see a merry-go-round of
weak puppet presidents, corrupt elected governments, and open dictatorship by
Batista, with growing frustration and dis-enchantment among the majority of
Cubans, whether workers, peasants, or middle-class. It was in particular the
failure of Grau and his associates in the Partido Auténtico (the Authentic
Party of the Cuban Revolution) which paved the way for Batista's 1952–58 dictatorship
and the real revolution which followed.
Although the young revolutionaries who coalesced around the activist
lawyer Fidel Castro Ruz in the early 1950s had some familiarity with socialist
ideas, their intellectual and political background was quite varied and
eclectic. Fidel himself was a member of the Partido Ortodoxo which had broken
away from the Auténticosa few years earlier in protest of their corruption and
abandonment of the principles of 1933. The Ortodoxoleader Eduardo Chibás was a
wealthy maverick who had been a student leader in 1933 and gained a mass
following from 1949 to 1951 with passionate rhetoric against corruption in his
weekly radio broadcasts. With his slogan "Vergüenza contra dinero"
("Honor against money"), Chibás revived the moral idealism which had
been a keynote of Cuban radicalism ever since Martí. Chibás shot himself during
his radio program in August 1951. There were mass demonstrations of mourning at
his funeral, and his populist appeal was the inspiration of the ortodoxos, many
of whom would join the M-26-7 a few
years later.
Another key figure in the ideological origins of the new
revolutionary movement was Antonio Guiteras, a young man who while still a
graduate student at the University
of Havana had become
minister of the interior in Grau San Martín's short-lived government. It was
Guiteras who had been the driving force behind the radical measures decreed in
those heady months of 1933, and when Grau was overthrown Guiteras went
underground and formed his own insurgent movement, Jóven Cuba (Young
Cuba), with an explicitly socialist program. As a popular figure and a
socialist activist independent of the Communist Party, Guiteras was clearly a
threat and it is not surprising that he was killed in 1935.
Guiteras was a representative of the autonomous Latin American
Marxist tradition associated with the Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui, and this
would be an important influence on several prominent members of the M-26-7 such
as Armando Hart. It was also the main ideological influence on the young
Argentine revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara who would meet Fidel
Castro and his comrades in Mexico
in 1955 and become a central figure in the revolution.
But in many ways the fundamental inspiration of the M-26-7
insurgents was the Cuban popular revolutionary tradition of the mambíses, of
José Martí and Antonio Maceo, the mulatto general of the liberation forces in
the wars against Spanish rule; an ideology of radical egalitarianism,
anti-imperialism, and agrarian self-sufficiency. It had much in common with
broader Latin American traditions going back to Simón Bolívar with his ideal of
continental unity and his distrust of gringo expansionism.
This is not to say that the Cuban revolutionaries of the 1950s were
anticommunist or unaffected by European and international Marxist and socialist
theories. But most of them were independent from the international Communist
movement and also from other organized international tendencies such as the
Trotskyists. This independence, and the ideological and tactical flexibility
which went with it, was crucial to their success.
By drawing on national popular traditions combined with the sense of
frustration and indignation against corruption, repression, and U.S.
domination, the revolutionaries were able to achieve not only military victory
but also mass popular support and enthusiasm. In January 1959 there was
enormous euphoria combined with a sense that anything was possible, and this
was expressed in the declarations of the leadership: "The revolution
cannot be made in a day, but rest assured that we will carry out the
revolution. Rest assured that for the first time the Republic will be
completely free and the people will have what they deserve" (Fidel Castro,
January 3);4 "the Revolution is as Cuban as the palm trees" and
"many people have not yet realized the scope of the change which has
occurred in our country" (Fidel, February 24);5 "On the First of
January 1959 we had done no more than conclude the war of independence; the
Revolution of Martí begins now" (Raúl Castro, March 13).6
In other words, without any reference to Marx, socialism, or class
struggle, there was an unequivocal commitment to radical change and to serving
the popular interest. Explicit ideological references were to the national
revolutionary heritage: defending the agrarian reform in June 1959, Fidel
declared that "what we are doing, you gentlemen who defend powerful
interests, what we are doing is to fulfill the declarations and the doctrine of
our Apostle [Martí], who said that the fatherland belonged to all and was for
the good of all";7 and in July 1959 he quoted Antonio Maceo: "The
Revolution will continue as long as there remains an injustice which has not
been remedied."8
That these declarations were not mere rhetoric swiftly became clear
as decisive action was taken in all areas of policy, and these actions served
to increase the overwhelming popular support for the revolutionary leadership.
With such massive support and with a monopoly of armed force, the new authorities
in Havana
enjoyed unprecedented freedom of action; internal opposition was virtually
paralyzed and no political party or organization was able to contest the
prestige of Fidel and the M-26-7 which had become in effect the national
liberation movement of the Cuban people.
In these circumstances an a priori socialist program would only have
been a hindrance: the strength of the revolution derived from its consensual
and inclusive character. When socialism was declared, it was more a reflection
of the new reality, an unexpected state of affairs which had come about as a
result of a dialectical process. The strength of the popular demand for
self-determination and social justice combined with the monopolistic structure
of the Cuban plantation economy and the direct and inevitable confrontation
with U.S.
imperialism made a socialist solution the only viable way forward from early
1960 onwards if the revolution were not to collapse through division and
incoherence. In terms of political economy, a good analysis of this dynamic is
to be found in James O'Connor's 1970 study, The Origins of Socialism in Cuba.9
The validity of this analysis was confirmed by interviews I
conducted in Cuba
in the 1990s. Several former members of the M-26-7, when questioned on the
evolution of their ideology during the armed struggle and in the first two to
three years after the victory of January 1, 1959, declared that their original
outlook was democratic, anti-imperialist, and favorable to social justice, but
not socialist and certainly not Communist or Marxist-Leninist. It was only at a
certain point in the revolutionary transformation, which most of them identify
as around mid- to late 1960 or 1961, that they came to the realization that
what they were creating in Cuba was a form of socialism; and Fidel's famous
declaration to this effect during the Bay of Pigs invasion simply confirmed
this in their minds: "Pues sí: ¡somos socialistas!" ("Well yes:
we are socialist!")
This is to my mind more than just a peculiarity of the Cuban
process: it confirms the implications of Gramsci's argument that for
proletarian ideology—Marxist theory—to triumph, it must win the battle for
hegemony and become "common sense." Or to put it another way, the
abstractions of Marxist theory must gel with the popular democratic traditions
of a specific country before they can become hegemonic. This is perhaps the
crucial error of most Communist (and also Trotskyist) parties: the idea that by
preaching abstract Marxist-Leninist doctrine they can build an effective mass
revolutionary movement.
The revolutionary euphoria of 1959–61 in Cuba
had much in common with the broad-based democratic grassroots ideology of the
antiglobalization and anticapitalist movements of recent times. The rejection
of established parties and dogmas, the belief in direct action, the quest for
new and original solutions: these were the characteristics of the creative
ferment which swept Cuba
in the early years of the revolution. True, from 1962 onwards this originality
began to be compromised by the adoption of Soviet models as a result of the
alliance necessitated by the Cold War context of the time, but despite this
Cuba maintained important aspects of its autonomy and creativity. The
"Cuban heresy" of the quest for the "New Man" and the
emphasis on moral incentives was an example of this, as was the continued Cuban
support for armed revolution in Latin America and Africa
(in contradiction to the Soviet aim of "peaceful coexistence").
After 1970 the apparent failure of the idealistic development
strategy associated with "moral incentives" and the defeat of
insurgent movements in many countries obliged Cuba to adopt a more orthodox
Soviet-style policy. For some fifteen years this appeared to yield results,
with high rates of GDP growth and economic stability. But by the mid-eighties
it was clear that Cuba's indebtedness to both the Soviet Union and the
capitalist countries was becoming a problem, as was the combination of rigid
bureaucratic centralism and material incentives under the Sistema de Dirección
y Planificación de la
Economía (Economic Management and Planning System).10
It was this which led to the launching of the "Rectification
Campaign" in 1986 and to Fidel's rejection of the Soviet policies of
glasnost and perestroika. Seen by many as "Stalinist" or
"conservative," this rejection of Gorbachev's policies was in fact
anything but: it reflected the Cuban leader's prescient understanding that this
type of top-down liberalization would necessarily lead in a capitalist direction.
It also reflected the belief that in Cuba ,
where—unlike the Soviet Union —grassroots
participation and revolutionary idealism had not yet been totally crushed by
decades of authoritarianism and sometimes brutal repression, socialism could be
reinvigorated by a combination of visionary leadership and popular
mobilization.
A crucial factor in Cuba 's
survival was the commitment and example of the leadership, especially Fidel.
But another essential point was that the socialist orientation of policy was
never abandoned: unlike Sandinista Nicaragua ,
which under severe pressure in the late eighties adopted IMF recommendations,
liberating prices of basic commodities, and marketizing social services, Cuba maintained
free universal health care and education and subsidized rates for housing and
utilities. It also intensified—rather than abandoning—democratic consultation
with the mass of the population regarding the measures to be taken. Just when
former Communist leaders were falling over each other to embrace capitalism and
Western governments were telling their populations there was no alternative to
neoliberalism, the Cuban leaders embarked on an extensive process of
consultation involving some 80,000 "workers' parliaments" throughout
the country in order to discuss the measures needed to resolve the economic
crisis.
Despite the conventional notion of Cuba as a dictatorship (albeit, for
those on the left, a benevolent one), the Cubans have always maintained that
they have their own form of socialist democracy. After what happened in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe , skepticism
about this is understandable. But one of the great errors of progressive
thought in recent decades has been the unquestioning acceptance of liberal
polyarchy as the only valid form of democracy; rejection of Stalinist
authoritarianism should not mean abandoning the Marxist critique of bourgeois
liberalism.
Democracy in the true sense—rule by the people—necessarily begins in
local communities, with people in neighborhoods and workplaces running their
own affairs. In this respect Cuba
has a vigorous system of local democracy. The direct nomination of candidates
in community meetings and their election as municipal delegates of popular
power in multi-candidate, secret-ballot elections, plus their obligation to
report back in person every six months in not just one but several local meetings
(with a real possibility of recall), guarantees a degree of local participation
and control which compares favorably with many countries that have impeccable
democratic credentials.11
It is true that at a higher level there are limitations, with
provincial and national delegates being presented on lists with only one
candidate for each post, so that the electorate's only option is to accept or
reject each candidate. Policy debates involve extensive popular input through
such instruments as workers' parliaments and consultations by commissions of
the National Assembly, but such debates clearly operate within centrally
designed parameters. Ultimately, it is undeniable that so long as the United
States is actively committed to the overthrow of the revolution, the full and
free expression of socialist democracy will be impossible in Cuba; but given
the way in which bourgeois elites manipulate liberal polyarchy to prevent any
serious challenge to the capitalist system, it is arguable that electorates in
Western countries have less influence than Cubans on policy decisions in
crucial areas such as finance, defense, and foreign policy.
But to argue the relevance of Cuba in today's world it is clearly
not sufficient just to defend the country's socialist system against its
critics. In the twenty-first century, does the island have anything to offer
which is not just a holdover from the past?
The answer is that there are at least two areas in which Cuba has made
vital contributions to the emergence of a new socialist or anticapitalist
alternative. One is in environmental issues: initially as a matter of
necessity, but now also as a matter of policy, it has undertaken a fundamental
switch toward organic agriculture and the adoption of ecologically sustainable
practices throughout the economy. For several years now it has pioneered the
development of urban agriculture, with small plots on any available land being
turned over to organopónicos, projects devoted to the intensive cultivation of
a wide variety of fruit and vegetables, mostly by organic methods. As a result
of this the city of Havana now produces 60 percent of its fruit and vegetables
within city limits,12 and the scheme is now being adopted in Venezuela and
other countries. The "Energy Revolution" has decentralized power
generation so that electricity is less dependent on big power plants and more
on small local generators which are more efficient and less vulnerable in
emergencies. Incandescent light bulbs have been replaced throughout the country
and there is large-scale investment in solar and wind power.13 Cuban officials
now state categorically that both capitalist and traditional socialist models
of energy-intensive development are unsustainable.
The second vital contribution to the emergence of a new alternative
lies in Cuba 's support for Venezuela , Bolivia , and other Latin American
countries now engaged in the struggle to create a new social and economic
model. Commentators frequently focus on Venezuela 's
aid to Cuba
in the form of cheap petroleum, but the importance of Cuban assistance to the
Bolivarian revolution should not be underestimated. Without the assistance of
thousands of Cubans, Chávez would have found it almost impossible to implement
the remarkable Barrio Adentro health mission or the Robinson literacy mission.
Similarly, Evo Morales would have been unable to implement such programs in Bolivia , at
least in the short run—and given the critical political situation in both
countries, the short run was and is crucial.
But also in broader political terms, without Cuba, Chávez (and
hence, at one remove, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and
Fernando Lugo in Paraguay) would have had much greater difficulty in gaining
credibility for projects of popular political empowerment implemented through
the appropriation and transformation of the state. The political disorientation
of the global left was such that only a totally unexpected movement like that
of Chávez could offer a way forward; and without Cuba 's inspiration and support at
crucial moments, Chávez might well have failed. Without Cuba , then, no Venezuela ;
and without Venezuela , no Bolivia , no Ecuador ,
and no Paraguay , and no
revival (however imperfect) of Sandinista Nicaragua .
It is not, of course, that nothing would have occurred in these
countries; but it is all too likely that without the Venezuelan example and
without Cuba 's
inspiration and practical assistance, the powerful popular movements that exist
would have been unable to devise an adequate strategy to attain power and to
use it effectively to reverse neoliberal policies. This does not mean that Venezuela or the other countries are simply
copying Cuba .
They are very clear that they are pursuing independent paths, borrowing from
and supporting each other and Cuba, but without making the old mistake of
trying to impose a uniform "orthodox" template.
Furthermore, the Cubans have been explicit in saying that they do
not regard their own socialism as a blueprint to be copied. What Cuba provided
was a living example, a demonstration that contrary to the conventional wisdom
of the "New World Order," the state is not powerless and that it is
possible to build and maintain a noncapitalist alternative. What was not
possible was to reproduce the Cuban strategy of armed revolution, and this was
the great contribution of Chávez and the Venezuelans: to devise a new strategy
which was neither purely military nor purely electoral, but a combination of
popular mobilization, elections, and military support.
As the new project of "twenty-first century socialism" and
the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) develops, Cuba also ties
in with the cultural and ideological inspiration of the Latin American popular
anti-imperialist tradition. As we have seen, the original Cuban ideology
derived at least as much from Martí and the mambíses as from international
socialist theory, and in this respect it gels perfectly with Chávez's
"Bolivarianism." It can be argued that, while the Soviet tie was
necessary at the time for the revolution's survival in the Cold War context, it
did lead to undesirable distortions in Cuban socialism, and that today Cuba,
freed from the Soviet straitjacket and assisted by its Latin neighbors, is
rediscovering its originality.
In this context the current Cuban reforms should not be seen as
leading in a capitalist direction (at least not necessarily), but as adapting
to the more flexible and dynamic project of "twenty-first century
socialism" which will eventually find similar (but not identical) expression
in Venezuela , Bolivia , and
other countries. It will be based on a recognition that socialism can never be
perfect, nor completely stable and secure, in an imperialist world, and that
its survival and renewal will always depend on popular support and
participation.14 The role of the state will still be important but it will
allow much greater scope for local and grassroots initiative, and indeed, for
what previously might have been condemned as capitalist material incentives.
But this is based on a recognition that egalitarianism cannot be imposed by
decree, and that the best guarantee against a return to capitalism lies in a
vigorous culture of collective participation rather than in bureaucratic
controls. Where the central state is and will remain crucial is in providing a
coherent overall direction, minimizing the encroachment of global capital, and
ensuring diplomatic, political, and military defense against imperialism.
Of course, over the years Cuba has made mistakes, and not all
of them are attributable to Soviet influence. The initial economic strategy of
crash industrialization soon proved impractical and was replaced by the
reliance on large-scale sugar exports as a source of accumulation for more
gradual diversification. Then in 1970 voluntarism led to near-disaster in the
failed goal of the ten million ton sugar harvest. The 1968 "Great
Revolutionary Offensive" led to the precipitous nationalization of small
business, with grave consequences for the availability of consumer goods and
services. There were also serious errors in cultural policy which have been
extensively criticized. But what saved Cuban socialism was a degree of popular
participation rarely found elsewhere, and the continued responsiveness of the
leadership to popular concerns and needs. Despite serious and often justified
grievances, the majority of the Cuban people have continued to feel that this
is their revolution and not just a paternalist project of a remote party/state
apparatus, and the result is that today the country continues to exhibit both
objective and subjective aspects of an anticapitalist alternative.
The Western media have been eager to interpret recent reforms in
agriculture, in wage and incentive scales, and in the availability of consumer
electronics as evidence that Cuba is embarking on a capitalist transition.15
But there is no indication that large-scale private employment of labor or a
private capital market with a stock exchange and similar capitalist
institutions are being contemplated. The government has reiterated its
commitment to free universal education and health care and other social
services. Cuba has recently
signed important new agreements with several countries, notably Brazil and the European Union, which improve its
capacity to resist the U.S.
blockade without abandoning its socialist priorities.
Finally, the extraordinary generosity and commitment of thousands of
Cuban internationalists providing medical and other services in conditions few
others would accept is living testimony to the reality of the country's
socialist project. The veteran British journalist Hugh O'Shaughnessy recently
offered a moving account of the Cuban missions in Bolivia . He quoted María de los
Ángeles, a Cuban doctor working as Director of the Ophthalmological Hospital in
El Alto, Bolivia, at nearly 4,000 metres altitude and in harsh conditions:
"I think there is always an element of love involved," she said:
"Before I left Cuba for Guatemala and Bolivia, I didn't know what real
poverty was like."16 While Cuba
continues to practice solidarity like this, its relevance to the global
anticapitalist movement can scarcely be questioned. But also, this presence in
the ALBA countries is further evidence that Cuba
cannot be separated from the inspiring new developments in Venezuela , Bolivia ,
and elsewhere: Latin America today demonstrates that another world really is
possible, and Cuba
is central to the creation of that world.
Notes
1. Revolución (Havana ), February 28, 1959. This and all
other translations from Cuban periodicals are mine.
2. Revolución, April 24, 1959.
3. José Martí, Inside the Monster, Philip
S. Foner, ed. (New York: Monthly Review, 1975), 3.
4. Revolución, January 4, 1959.
5. Revolución, February 25, 1959.
6. Revolución, March 14, 1959.
7. Revolución, June 8, 1959.
8. La Calle (Havana ),
August 1, 1959.
9. See James O'Connor, The Origins of
Socialism in Cuba
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970).
10. One of the best discussions of this is
to be found in Ken Cole, Cuba
(London: Pinter, 1998), chapter 3.
11. On this issue, see Arnold
August, Democracy in Cuba
and the 1997–98 Elections (Havana: Editorial José Martí, 1999), and Peter
Roman, People's Power (Lanham ,
MD : Rowman & Littlefield,
2003).
12. Simon Butler, "Cuba carries
out new land reform," Green Left Online, August 16, 2008,
www.greenleft.org.au/2008/763/39410
13. "Cuban agriculture"
(interview with Roberto Pèrez), Fight Racism! Fight Imperialism! (UK ), no. 205
(October/November 2008): 10.
14. See Michael A. Lebowitz, Build It Now (New York : Monthly Review Press, 2006), and D. L. Raby,
Democracy and Revolution (London :
Pluto Press, 2006), especially chapter 3.
15. See for example "Cuban workers to
get bonuses for extra effort," The Guardian (UK), June 13, 2008, and
"Cuba 's
wage changes have nothing to do with a return to capitalism," Helen Yaffe,
The Guardian, June 20, 2008.
16. Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Misiones cubanas en
Bolivia ,
4 de abril de 2008,
二、It's Time to Address Racism in Cuba 以上兩則沒有中文,sorry
三、邁阿密的古巴人2與3放在一個檔案
一、It’s Time to Address Racism in Cuba
(在後)
二、邁阿密的古巴人
最近,古巴政府慶祝古巴革命50周年。自從菲德爾﹒卡斯特羅成為古巴統治者以來,有近兩百萬古巴人逃離共產黨統治,幾乎有一半在美國邁阿密地區安家落戶。
BBC記者艾米利奧﹒聖佩特羅回顧過去,發現這個古巴流亡者社區對於他的成長以及邁阿密的發展產生了巨大影響:
所有在美國邁阿密出生的古巴兒童都和我一樣,從小就被教導,我們來到這裡完全是偶然的。
我們是流亡者,不是移民。我們到這裡只是暫時過一段流亡生活。
我們還被告知,在美國的幫助下,古巴最高領導人菲德爾﹒卡斯特羅將會被趕下台,一切都將很快恢復正常,不管這對於古巴動蕩的政治現實意味著什麼。
作為新一代正在成長的古巴流亡者,我們有必要把學習西班牙和維護父輩的文化傳統和習俗作為頭等大事來抓。對於我們來說,美國的熔爐概念是不存在的。
我們在美國的中心地帶,但是卻過著一種與世隔絕,整天與古巴人打交道的生活。
所謂的美國人只不過是我們在街上偶爾遇到的人:他們是學校的老師、銀行裡的職員、或者是電視上那些多姿多彩的明星。
我還清楚地記得小時候在一個古巴人管理的幼兒園裡,我們每天都要唱古巴國歌,我們談論最多的是古巴獨立運動之父何塞﹒馬蒂,而不是美國國父喬治?華盛頓。我們每年舉行聖誕節聚會時,就連聖誕老人都滿口西班牙語。
學會提出問題
我的整個生活被古巴和我父親的宿敵菲德爾﹒卡斯特羅所統治著。
父親和他的朋友會連續忙上幾天時間,組織抗議以及其他政治活動,要求結束古巴共產黨的統治。
我還記得父親如何為他在家裡編輯出版的政治報紙"國民報"版面做最後修改。我想,你也可以說,他類似於當今網上異見博客作者,只是那個年頭還沒有互聯網。
幾十年過去了,我終於得出結論,我父親與親戚之間就如何促進古巴變革所舉行的激烈緊張辯論以及他們之間存在巨大分歧,為我後來從事新聞記者事業打下了堅實的基礎。
從很小的時候,我就開始聽不同觀點的辯論,然後提出許多問題。
我父親一直在為結束"共產黨統治"的那一天而努力工作。每一個像我父親這樣的人,身邊就有五、六個人像我母親一樣,整天為養家糊口而不知疲倦地忙碌著。
如果沒有人去打工掙錢,維持一家人的生活,那是沒法去追求崇高理想的。
戰鬥精神
母親名叫亞美莉亞。我曾與她談過他們老一代流亡者這種吃苦耐勞的精神。母親對我說,她最初也感到極難適應這樣的生活,因為她過去在古巴的生活還是很舒適的。
她與許多上私校的女孩一樣,學會了縫紉和編制並把這些技巧作為一種嗜好。但是她萬萬沒有想到兒童時代的嗜好竟然成為我們流亡美國第一個10年維持生活的手段。
母親還給我講述了她和父親、哥哥、姐姐在1960年抵達邁阿密時,身上只有三四百美元,隨身只帶了幾個箱子,裡面裝的都是衣服和生活必需品。
幾個月後,形勢明朗了,看來推翻卡斯特羅並不是一個晚上就能做到的。
由於家裡帶過來的錢快用光了,母親不得不到一家服裝廠去打工。她的女工生活就是這樣開始的。
今天,母親已經81歲高齡,但是她仍然整天在工作,好像身上有使不完的力氣。
母親逃離祖國,在一個陌生的土地上舉目無親,不得不面對殘酷的現實。這一打擊激發了她的戰鬥精神,而這種精神一直保持到今天。
驕傲的社區
在美國的古巴流亡者社區政治色彩強烈以及邁阿密居住的古巴人在過去50年一直堅持反對卡斯特羅的強硬路線,引起許多評論,其中大多數是負面的。
實際上,流亡者社區中有一些人士採取的行動是很有問題的,其中包括暴力行動。
這就更加深了人們的印象,感到這些古巴流亡者是一群頑固不化的強硬分子。
但是如果從一個特別的、更宏觀的角度來觀察這座複雜的城市,我發現,在這些古巴人引發的強烈政治色彩和國際媒體大字標題的下面,隱藏著一個驕傲移民社區傳奇故事。
在過去50年裡,這個社區不但取得了巨大的進步,而且在美國為自己創造了新的生活。
在這個過程中,古巴人也為邁阿密變成一個國際化大都市發揮了積極的作用。
|
It’s Time to Address Racism in Cuba
By PATRICIA GROGG
A slice of the racial mix that is Cuba ,
photo by Caridad
The first
documentary on racial discrimination in this Caribbean island nation was filmed
here in 2008, incorporating opinions from
well-known artists and intellectuals that go to the heart of the controversy. “Raza” (Race), by young filmmaker Eric Corvalan,
could serve as a starting-point to launch the long-delayed debate.
“So far,
racism has only been talked about in academia, among intellectuals. I think
there should be an open, public discussion, even in
parliament,” the 36-year-old Corvalan told
IPS.
“In 50 years (since the revolution),
women’s issues and homosexuality have been debated: why hasn’t racism?” asked
the filmmaker. “It’s a revolutionary topic that concerns everyone, because
there are black women, black homosexuals and black men.”
“I think silence is worse. The longer
nothing is said, the more the racism fermenting underground is rotting the
entire nation,” singer/songwriter Gerardo Alfonso says in the documentary.
According to Roberto Zurbano, head of the
Casa de las Americas publishing house, to carry on “hiding” the issue would
lead black people to think that “they belong to another country, and that there
are two Cuba’s as there were in the 19th century, a black Cuba and a white
one.” Another possible implication is that “the issue could become a political
football, outside and inside the country.”
In the debate on race in Cuba , the media
have drawn some of the heaviest criticism for allegedly fomenting stereotypes
that identify black people and people of mixed ancestry with crime, or with
very specific activities like sports and music, while establishing the idea of
white “normality.”
“The media must help to create a balanced
portrait of black people, which is lacking, so a racist stereotype is
constructed by society,” Corvalan said. “Why can’t we make films starring
blacks, whether as lawyers, doctors or engineers?”
According to Irene Ester,
who holds a degree in audiovisual communications, television will never
contribute to demythologizing race as long as it only emphasizes the high
proportion of black people in prison, working as prostitutes, or unemployed,
instead of the “heroism” and special characteristics of black families.
There is also an absence of models in the
education system, especially in the teaching of national history. The first
Africans arrived in Cuba
in the early 16th century, brought in as slaves by the Spanish colonialists.
Slavery was abolished in 1886.
“In primary education, skin color is not
mentioned,” academic Esteban Morales says in the film. “If we are still living
in a society where white people have the power, and we don’t mention color in
education, we are in practice educating children to be white.
“Cuban history as we teach it is a
disgrace, because it is predominantly white history, and explaining the role of black people and mulattos in building this society
and its culture is not given its due importance,” says Morales, of the University of Havana ’s Centre for the Study of the
Hemisphere and the United States (CEHSEU).
Blacks and
people of mixed-race heritage officially make up 34.9 percent of Cuba ’s
total population of 11.2 million, according to the latest census, carried out
in 2002.
However, most Cuban
academics estimate that between 60 and 70 percent of the population is black or
“mulatto”
Article 42 of the Cuban constitution
states: “Discrimination because of race, skin color, sex, national origin,
religious beliefs and any other form of discrimination harmful to human dignity
is forbidden and punishable by law.” In May 1961, the government eliminated
racial segregation by nationalizing all clubs and associations.
But equality before the law has not
succeeded in closing the socioeconomic gaps between different racial groups.
The Cuban cultural journal Temas published
studies by the governmental Anthropology Centre in 2006 that showed that on average, the black population has worse housing, receives
less money in remittances from abroad and has less access to jobs in emerging
economic sectors like tourism, in which blacks represent barely five percent of managers and professionals,
than the white population.
“Equal rights does not mean social
equality,” Morales says. “We do not have the same social standing, or the same
opportunities. This is what has generally happened to non-white and black
people in Cuba .”
“If, 50 years after the revolution, there
are still visible signs of racism in society, it means that equality of rights
hasn’t been sufficient,” says Alfonso.
The issue of racism remains “taboo, a
complicated and thorny” question, as Corvalan was told by some institutions
where he showed his documentary, made with support from the non-governmental
Martin Luther King Memorial Centre (CMMLK), the Higher Institute of Art (ISA)
and Delfin, an independent producer.
“We made a revolution in this country,
which is what sets us apart from other nations,” Zurbano said. “It’s a
tremendous opportunity that revolutionaries of any color cannot let slip away,
in the sense that we can create a strategy, and it can evolve.”
After the
documentary’s premiere at the recent Latin American Film Festival in Havana , Corvalan
was thanked by black and mixed-race people, some of whom were surprised to see
that a white person was interested in racism.
“I don’t think of myself as white or black
or mixed-race, I’m just Cuban,” said Corvalan, who has French and Chilean
ancestry.
0 意見:
張貼留言