「台灣古巴後援會籌備中」，第797期通訊，2025年1月31日。
2025年1月31日古巴通訊797期
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Life in Cuba Has Grown Harder. Biden’s Modest Reversal Was Too Little Too Late. 19
By Danny Shaw / The Grayzone
Danny Shaw has been traveling to Cuba since 1995 in support of the country’s socialist revolution. Unsatisfied with the official proclamations and guided tours for international leftists, he embarked on a project of first-hand ethnographic research across the country over the decades. With a command of Cuban Spanish, Shaw wandered off the beaten path, independently evaluating conditions in the country. Surveying the perspectives of some of the most marginalized populations in Havana, he assesses their responses to the US unilateral blockade and Cuba’s isolation.
On Jan. 1, Cuba officially joined the international grouping known as BRICS, as one of 13 nations incorporated as “partner states.” The date, which coincides with the 66th anniversary of the triumph of their revolution, could mark a turning point for the beleaguered socialist state. But unless the country’s leaders embrace a strategic fiscal shift in the face of an asphyxiating US blockade, the prospect of state collapse – and the unraveling of over a half century of revolutionary social development – can not be dismissed.
“Ataca Sabroso” (Attack With Sweetness)
Throughout my decades of firsthand research in Cuba, few figures seemed to embody the revolution — and all its contradictions — like “Sumy,” the boxer. A slender 6′ 2,” at 60 years old, he could still pass for 39. Known for a long, stiff jab that snapped heads back, the retired fighter turned long-time high school principal still has his dazzling punching combinations. For two decades, Jesús Miguel Rodríguez Muro, known by his nickname Sumy, glided through cruiserweight boxing competitions across Cuba. Internationally, he made a name for himself as well, fighting in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries.
A dedicated member of the Cuban Communist Party, Sumy resides in Arroyo Naranjo, an outer municipality of Havana. The retired athlete lived as all Cubans do: modestly. During a recent visit, his feet swung off a small ramshackle bed. He had a collection of books and notebooks stacked on a bookshelf that was on its last leg. His bedroom, which moonlit as a living room, was furnished with a tiny TV straight out of the 1980s and a transistor radio that one might see in a Vietnam war movie. At night time, when hunger stirred and no protein was available, Sumy grabbed two pieces of cheap cake and tossed them into an empty loaf of bread. He devoured the make-shift stuffed gyro, winking at his boxing students: “Sabroso, sabroso!”
US intelligence exploits Cuban youth’s malaise
The Cuban Revolution once guaranteed every citizen health care, education and basic social and economic rights. In Sumy’s case, the shift could be clearly delineated by generation. Sumy’s parents’ generation made the revolution. Sumy’s generation benefited from the social transformation and fortified it. But Sumy’s children’s generation, who came of age in the 1990s, have had a different experience. In the words of one mother and communist militant in Marianao: “The new generation has only lived in a period of sacrifice and more sacrifice. They don’t remember the struggle against Batista nor the first decade of the revolution, with those marvelous debates and experiments we had at that time. They only know austerity.”
The collapse can be felt throughout Cuba’s economy, and perhaps nowhere more acutely than its critical sugar industry. Initially, collectivization proved immensely successful, with Cuba under Castro reaching a peak of 8.5 million metric tonnes of sugar between 1969 and 1970. In the early 90s, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuban farmers still produced 7 million metric tons, accounting for a whopping 30% of global sugar exports. But the number fell by half virtually overnight as Cuba’s friends abroad disappeared, and continued to dwindle in the intervening years.
The decline has become more pronounced in recent years, as the number of functioning sugar mills in Cuba has dropped to just 16, with US sanctions continuing to make repairs near-impossible. In 2019, the island managed to produce 1.3 million metric tons of sugar. By 2023, that number dropped to 350,000, with the island failing – for the first time since the 1800s – to produce enough sugar to provide for domestic consumption. As economist Juan Triana explained, it’s difficult to overstate the significance of the massive dropoff in sugar: “For more than 150 years, the industry of sugarcane was both the main export income and the locomotive for the rest of the economy. That’s what we’ve lost.”
Tourism, which overtook sugar as Cuba’s top industry in 1997, has nearly evaporated in the same recent span. Following the appearance of COVID, the island’s visitors dropped from over 4,000,000 per year to just 356,500 in 2021.
Now, Cuba has neither the foreign revenue nor a self-reliant economy to feed its people. The island has been teetering on the brink of disaster since 1990; the start of the pandemic only exacerbated the situation. There are routine blackout crises. Gas shortages are frequent. A trip across Havana on public transportation can take three hours or more. Residents, fatigued by six and a half decades of a Cold War, are demanding “electricity and food.” The imperialist Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) forecasts that this reality will spurn more protests. Rations are down to a bare minimum and even those are often not available. According to one doctor and Cuban Communist Party leader known by his nom de guerre, Oldanier: “We live like Palestinians minus the bombing. Malnutrition is everywhere. Inflation has skyrocketed. The state cannot pay our salaries. Child mortality is way up. More and more people are fleeing.”
Cuba, like many nations targeted by the US for regime change, has seen a major exodus in recent years, with nearly half a million Cubans – representing a full 5% of the Cuban population – reportedly attempting to immigrate to the United States between 2021 and 2023.
The end of rations?
Before the aggravated crisis that began with the pandemic, every month, each member of a household in Cuba received a monthly “canasta básica” (basic basket) consisting of an allotment of rice, chickpeas, black beans, cooking oil, salt, sugar, coffee, soap, bread, eggs, chicken, tobacco, and toothpaste. Now, residents complain that portions have dropped significantly, rice arrives late, and chicken has vanished, replaced by cans of potted meat. If a family wants fruit, vegetables, or anything beyond la libreta (the ration book), it is up to their own individual spending ability. Families describe the creative artform of stretching a meager amount of food for the entire month, with one explaining how they saved up extra eggs for New Years Eve in order to be able to give their children some type of treat that night.
Cuba’s internationally-renowned medical sector, once the pride of Latin America, hasn’t been immune to the downturn either. “We cannot provide what is required for those with diabetes and other sick people,” one nurse lamented.
Due to shortages deliberately caused by the intensification of the trade embargo, Cuba’s inflation rate is an astronomical 39.1%. Access to dollars is the only way many people can eat. They can access the private Micro and Small Enterprises stores (MYPIMES) which sell food and other products at prices pegged to the dollar and euro. This means that to buy a pound of chicken in “the free market,” a Cuban will spend up to 20 percent of their monthly salary. For two weeks of milk, they may spend two weeks of their salary. Many Communist Party vets say these are their worst economic conditions yet. One community leader lamented: “We don’t have medication. I am a diabetic. We just keep losing weight. Look at these 25 pounds I have lost. Carlos Lazo’s Bridges of Love (Puentes de Amor) program helps us but it is not enough.”
With no indication that things will improve anytime soon, many Cubans – specifically, young adults – want out. Meanwhile, their blockaded futures provide fertile soil for the next color revolution attempt.
The younger generation of Cubans are mostly singing a different tune than Sumy and the revolutionary old guard. US intelligence is doing all it can to exploit the resentments of those elements which USAID branded as “desocialized and marginalized youth” from Afro-Cuban communities. As Max Blumenthal reported for The Grayzone, US intelligence has invested millions in a Cultural Cold War-style program to boost counterrevolutionary rappers, artists and activists.
The first wave of weaponized Cuban artists emerged from the so-called San Isidro Movement. I first met San Isidro founders Amaury Pacheco, Omni Zona Franca and some of the collective’s future activists in 2001 at poetry and music festivals in Alamar, Havana del Este. While these dreadlocked, anarchist-oriented performers claimed to be “non-ideological,” it was clear they were the kind of “dissidents” the CIA was courting to lead the counterrevolution. They were fiercely dedicated to toppling the Cuban state and eager to work with any foreigners who could help them travel internationally and advocate for a Western-style color revolution in Cuba.
In July 2021, the San Isidro Movement became the driving force behind unprecedented protests in cities across the country against the Cuban revolution and conditions on the island in July 2021. Though the demonstrations petered out quickly, and without the brute repression US media clearly hoped for, they triggered renewed calls for regime change from Western capitols. The Biden administration invoked the brief protest wave as justification for discarding Obama’s move toward normalization with Havana.
Destitution by design
The destruction of Cuba’s economy represents an undeniable success of decades of US foreign policy. The Trump and Biden administrations ultimately remained faithful to the original objective of the 1960 blockade – as have those that preceded them, including that of Barack Obama, who only slightly tweaked certain stipulations restricting travel. A year after the revolution’s triumph, Eisenhower calculated: “If the Cuban people are hungry, they will throw Castro out.” Four months later, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Lester D. Mallory agreed: “Every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba… to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of the government.”
Drafted in 1960, the US government’s “Program of Covert Action” continues to inform US policy towards Cuba. For six decades, the US has sought to suffocate and destroy Cuba’s self-determination.
More than 3,400 Cubans have been killed by US state terrorism since the revolution. US intelligence plotted and organized 638 known attempts on Fidel Castro’s life. Biological warfare has been used such as the intentional infection of the island’s pig population with the swine virus. It is more difficult to calculate the human cost of sanctions. Hunger and migration are the two most common results. Over 200,000 Cubans have been forced to leave their homeland in the past year and a half, a figure even larger than previous migrations such as the Marielitos and the 1994 “rafters.”
Every policy of today’s most powerful empire has been calculated and designed to inflict regime change in Cuba, a euphemism for the complete overhaul of class relations. Ignoring these external pressures, the legacy media hyper fixates on repression in Cuba instead. The constant threats, harassment and US intelligence-backed terrorist campaigns have successfully instilled a level of paranoia in Cuban leadership, which has had to focus precious resources on national security. This defensive posture plays right into the hands of Cuba’s would-be colonizers in Washington and Miami.
Whether it is framed as Biden’s last hoorah or Trump’s opening salvo, the US national security elite, drunk off its genocidal rampage across the Middle East, still wants to overthrow the Cuban government. On the island, rumors swirl that the US is planning another San Isidro-style color revolution attempt in hopes of provoking state repression. This would naturally pave the way for Elon Musk-aligned influencers and the corporate media to frame “Communist Cuba” as a bastion of repression and provide Washington with a justification to finish off the recalcitrant state.
Multipolarity: Cuba’s only hope
The Cuban leadership, seasoned by six decades of resistance, is searching for a response to the hybrid war and its impact on morale. They respond as any fighter who is fighting above their weight does: aggressively and desperately. Now, it’s become clear that their only way to break the blockade is multipolarity.
Visits back and forth between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Cuban counterpart highlight Cuba’s increasing resolve to build up their own Chinese style competitive state companies which would put an end to the food shortages. Cuba hosted the Group of 77 last year, the largest international organization after the United Nations itself. 134 countries, or 80 percent of the world population, are currently represented in the now misnamed “Group of 77.” From Havana, chairman of the Group of 77, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel, insisted: “After all this time that the North has organized the world according to its interests, it is now up to the South to change the rules of the game.” Cuba, along with 34 other countries, has applied for membership in BRICS. The addition of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and Argentina (contested by the new president Milei) at the beginning of 2024, means the BRICS bloc nations now constitute 42% of the world’s population and account for 23% of gross domestic product and 18% of global trade. Cuba’s future does not run through Wall Street or the Beltway, it runs through Moscow, Beijing, Caracas, Tehran, Johannesburg and the other burgeoning centers of multipolarity.
President Diaz-Canel visited Iran to discuss mutually-beneficial ways to break the embargoes. The Deputy President Salvador Valdés Mesa travelled to South Africa to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties. On May 9th, the 79th anniversary of the Soviet Day of Victory over Fascism, the Cuban president celebrated with Vladimir Putin in the Grand Kremlin Palace. Cuba hosted a fleet of Russian warships in its harbors, just 500 miles from nuclear-powered US attack submarines which continue to occupy Guantanamo Bay.
One of Cuba’s most malicious enemies, incoming Cuban-American Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has warned of the shifting geopolitical dimensions. Alarmed by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s multipolar instincts and his visits to Beijing and beyond, the neoconservative Florida senator appeared anxious on Fox News: “We won’t have to talk about sanctions in five years because there’ll be so many countries transacting in currencies other than the dollar that we won’t have the ability to sanction them.” Could the “sanction inability” theory, as the Chinese Global Times calls it, spell relief for the Cuban people or is it too late? In theory, Cuba should no longer be an isolated state standing on its own. So why is this not translating into relief for the Cuban people?
Unfortunately for Cubans, you cannot yet feed your children nor fuel your cars with multipolarity. Capitalism demands instant gratification. And the average young Cuban knows there’s far more to be found in Miami than Havana.
Argentinian sociologist Atilio Borón, analyzing the impact of Western sanctions on South American and Caribbean countries, explained that hunger was more dangerous than any weapons system that Washington could deploy. An air-tight blockade is inflicting acute hunger and despair on the over 11,000,000 people of Cuba. Supporters of Cuba and the leaders of the multipolar world have a responsibility to ask: Before the most powerful empire in history, how much longer can the revolution hold on?
Late rounds in Cuba’s fight for survival
There are two January showdowns shaping up in the Caribbean. On January 1st 2025, the 66th anniversary of the revolution, Cuba will officially become a member of BRICS. On January 20th, Donald Trump and his cabinet of billionaires will take state power in the United States. Trump enacted a further 243 coercive measures against Cuba when he assumed office in 2016. The Biden administration continued to tighten the noose around Cuba. The US has not recognized Nicolas Maduro, Cuba’s closest ally, as the president of Venezuela, instead designating right-wing opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez as the country’s leader. This sets up a clash for inauguration day in Caracas on January 10th, 2025—which the US is looking to exploit.
This December, the Department of Defense signed an agreement with Trinidad and Tobago which allows them “to deploy forces to Trinidad and Tobago in the event of a “conflict” in Venezuela.” And another US-supported San Isidro-style color revolution attempt against Cuba is expected in the opening months of Trump’s second term.
Fidel Castro highlighted the centrality of the ideological struggle, the showdown for the heart and soul of a people. On the 66th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, many Habaneros are gripped with an acute sense that Western leftist tourists and solidarity activists have over-glorified their reality. Something has to give. Either the expanded BRICS nations will incorporate Cuba into their multipolar economic, political and diplomatic expansion or the vultures will finish Cuba off. There is no middle ground.
Cuba’s fight for survival resembles the boxing career of Mohammed Ali. For the first three decades, the revolution was youthful, sharp, bold and invincible. Past generations of Cubans fought for Angola and Syria, stood with Grenada and the Sandinistas, admiring and emulating the heroes of the revolution. This generation faces hunger, despair and isolation, with the government outmatched by objective reality. With the collapse of the anti-capitalist rival pole of the Cold War era, Cuba has been left to fight on its own.
Multipolarity may be on the rise, but as the Western-backed genocide in Gaza and the setbacks suffered by the Axis of Resistance show, US hegemony has proven resilient. As in Ali’s final rounds, exhausted, with its vulnerabilities exposed, the island nation still somehow miraculously pushes through, paying a long-term price as it weathers one punishing blow after another. Unlike a prize fighter, the descendants of José Martí and Fidel Castro do not have the option of giving up or retiring.
Why Are Cuba and the U.S. Still Mired in the Cold War?
William M. LeoGrande. Foreign Policy. December 12, 2024
Ten years ago this month, the United States and Cuba reached a historic deal to normalize diplomatic relations, which was intended to end decades of acrimonious conflict between the two countries and bring prosperity to Cuba. Instead, relations today are at a low point, and Cuba is facing one of the worst economic crises in its history. What went wrong? How is it that a dramatic foreign-policy initiative—one as momentous as U.S. President Richard Nixon’s opening to China and broadly supported by the American people and U.S. allies around the world—failed to establish what President Barack Obama called “a new chapter” in the tormented history of U.S.-Cuba relations?
It began auspiciously. On Dec. 17, 2014, Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro stunned the world with their simultaneous televised announcement that the United States and Cuba had agreed to restore ties. “Today, America chooses to cut loose the shackles of the past so as to reach for a better future—for the Cuban people, for the American people, for our entire hemisphere, and for the world,” Obama announced. Within the privacy of the Oval Office he was even more effusive, declaring, “As Joe Biden would say, this is a big fucking deal.’”
And so it was. After more than 50 years of perpetual hostility in U.S. policy toward Cuba—dominated by dangerous Cold War episodes such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban missile crisis, CIA assassination plots, terrorist exile violence, and the enduring U.S. trade embargo—the rapprochement between Washington and Havana marked a historic foreign-policy achievement. In short order, Havana and Washington reopened embassies, normalized U.S. travel, expanded trade and commerce, and began collaborating on key areas of mutual interest. In March 2016, Obama became the first sitting U.S. president to travel to Havana since 1928. “I have come here to bury the last remnant of the Cold War in the Americas,” Obama declared in his address to the Cuban people. “The path we are on will continue beyond my administration,” he predicted in a press conference with Raúl Castro.
Obama’s optimism proved to be wrong. During the Trump administration, the historic opening to Havana was all but closed. One by one, President Donald Trump rescinded Obama’s executive authorizations on travel and commerce, replacing them with a slew of new, punishing sanctions—penalties that remained largely unaltered during Joe Biden’s presidency.
Now, the euphoria and economic dynamism generated by the agreement are long gone. The Cuban economy has all but collapsed, stricken by massive shortages of food, medicine, fuel, and electricity that have created a dire humanitarian crisis for the populace. Those who can are leaving the island in droves; those who can’t are suffering widespread deprivation. Ten years after the high hopes generated by rapprochement, many Cubans are experiencing a profound sense of hopelessness for the future.
And the worst may be yet to come. With Trump’s reelection in the 2024 presidential election, and his nomination of hardliner Sen. Marco Rubio for secretary of state, Cuba faces a return to the Cold War-era of regime-change intervention. As tensions mount in the months ahead, the 10th anniversary of rapprochement serves as a reminder that there is a productive alternative to a posture of hostility and regime change—one that ought to appeal to a president determined to reduce irregular migration, blunt the hemispheric influence of China and Russia, and avoid pointless foreign conflicts.
The Cuba Détente
The history-making accord between the United States and Cuba was a product of political courage and a tenacious commitment to creative diplomacy on both sides. The courage belongs mostly to Obama, who was determined to address an intractable foreign-policy challenge that had bedeviled many of his predecessors. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, President Jimmy Carter, and President Bill Clinton all demanded quid pro quos in secret talks to improve relations with the Castro regime, whereas Obama chose “to play the long game with Cuba,” according to Richard Feinberg, former senior director of inter-American affairs at the National Security Council (NSC). Instead of demanding concessions, Obama exercised strategic patience in moving unilaterally to normalize bilateral ties, calculating that closer cultural, political, and economic relations would eventually result in meaningful reforms on the island.
In early 2013, Obama tasked his deputy national security advisor, Benjamin Rhodes, to open a back channel to Cuba with the goal of fundamentally changing the future of U.S.-Cuban relations. Astutely, Obama decided to avoid incremental steps and instead pursue a diplomatic full Monty. “If I’m going to do this, I want to do as much as we can all at once,” he instructed Rhodes.
The ultra-secret diplomacy between Washington and Havana took place during furtive meetings in Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, and, finally, at the Vatican in Rome. Rhodes and Ricardo Zuñiga, who was a senior director for Western Hemisphere affairs at the NSC at the time, represented Obama; Raúl Castro assigned his son, Maj. Alejandro Castro and another military officer. Over the course of 18 months, the two sides negotiated both a prisoner exchange—swapping Alan Gross, a subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development and a high-level CIA mole captured in Cuba, for three Cuban espionage agents who were part of the “Cuban Five” spy network and incarcerated in the United States since 1998—and the process for normalizing relations. On Dec. 16, President Obama placed a direct call to Raúl Castro from the Oval Office to finalize details of the deal. “There was a sense of history in that room,” recalled Zuñiga, who was present.
In Cuba, Dec. 17, 2014, is known as diez y siete d—the iconic day of 17-D. By coincidence, we were both in Havana at an annual conference on U.S.-Cuban relations when news of the dramatic breakthrough broke. Public euphoria was instantaneous. People flooded into the streets, car horns blared, and church bells rang. Waiters and busboys shook our hands, gave us high-fives and even hugs. “I am finally going to be able to buy a new Ford van,” exclaimed one driver of the vintage American cars that provide taxi services in Cuba, summing up the hopes of the Cuban people for a better future.
In their televised presentations, the two presidents outlined the contours of a new relationship. As a humanitarian gesture, Cuba agreed to release 53 political prisoners and engage with the International Red Cross and United Nations on human rights and prison conditions. Obama pledged to review Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and to loosen restrictions on travel and trade. Both countries agreed to formally reinaugurate their embassies, which were closed when President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration broke diplomatic ties with Cuba in January 1961, but reopened as interest sections during the Carter administration.
The process of normalization moved quickly. After an official review, the White House removed Cuba from the State Department list of state sponsors of international terrorism in 2015, and both countries officially reopened their embassies that summer. As he prepared for his historic trip to Havana in March 2016, Obama significantly loosened travel restrictions on visiting the island, allowing individual travelers to go under the broad people-to-people category. To facilitate travel, the administration resumed regular commercial air service; for the first time in over half a century, travelers could fly to Cuba on U.S. carriers such as American Airlines, Delta, United, and JetBlue. Obama also authorized U.S. cruise ships to port in Cuban harbors. “We have enormous confidence in the American people as ambassadors for the things that we care about,” Rhodes said at the time. “We believe that’s the best way to connect the Cuban people with the wider world.”
Positive Engagement: A Success Story
The honeymoon of détente with Cuba lasted just over two years. But even in that short time, it produced measurable results. Although hardliners, led by Rubio and former Sen. Robert Menendez, attacked Obama for failing to negotiate the capitulation of the Cuban government, the brief era of reconciliation was overwhelming successful by any reasonable standard of foreign-policy objectives.
To expand cooperation on areas of mutual strategic and international interests, Washington and Havana established a bilateral commission to oversee the work of 18 diplomatic working groups, including ones on national security issues like migration, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism. Two of the groups also began discussions on contentious issues: human rights and property claims.
Relaxing travel restrictions allowed U.S. residents to see Cuba for themselves. During the first year of normalization, the number of U.S. visitors to Cuba rose from 92,000 to 163,000; after Obama restored commercial air service and authorized cruise ships to include Cuban ports of call, the floodgates of U.S. travel to Cuba opened and the numbers rose exponentially. In addition to 517,000 Cuban Americans who visited family in 2016, more than 600,000 other U.S. travelers set foot on the island in 2016 and 2017 before Trump’s travel restrictions took effect.
The influx of U.S. travelers provided an immediate boost to the Cuban economy, particularly the fledgling private sector. The number of Cuban entrepreneurs catering to tourists—taxi drivers, restaurateurs, tour guides, artists, musicians, and private hotel owners, among others—exploded overnight. Airbnb rentals illustrate the dramatic financial impact. In 2015, when Obama authorized Airbnb to begin working with private Cuban homeowners who wanted to rent rooms to U.S. visitors, the site recorded some 2,000 bookings; by 2019, that number had risen to 35,000. Cuba became one of Airbnb’s fastest-growing markets, vastly expanding job opportunities for homeowners, cooks, housecleaners, painters, carpenters, drivers, and guides. During Obama’s trip to Havana in March 2016, a Republican member of his business entourage, former Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez, characterized Obama’s strategy as “a great journey of human rights” because it advanced the cause of individual economic independence and the freedom for Cubans “to develop their own future, their own vision for their life.”
Obama’s entourage also included high-profile executives from Airbnb, PayPal, and Marriott, among other corporate representatives. Along with Obama, they met with many Cuban entrepreneurs, sending a clear signal of support for the private sector. “The embargo is going to end,” Obama predicted during a press conference with Raúl Castro. “This is a new day—es un nuevo día—between our two countries.”
The Trump Rollback
In the aftermath of Obama’s trip, White House officials optimistically believed that the process of normalizing U.S.-Cuba relations was not only successful—it was now “irreversible.” “The fact of the matter is that the American people and the Cuban people overwhelmingly want this to happen,” Rhodes said in June 2016. “For somebody to try to turn this off, they would have to be working against the overwhelming desires of their own people. That ship has sailed.”
To be sure, Obama’s opening to Cuba was immensely popular both at home and abroad. U.S. allies universally applauded it, Pope Francis blessed it, the Cuban people loved it, and the general U.S. public supported it, including more than half of Cuban Americans. Even an interagency review conducted during Trump’s first months in office concluded that Obama’s positive engagement was a foreign-policy success. But although engagement produced dramatic results, especially on the diplomatic front, two years was not long enough for it to put down roots. No significant domestic constituency, particularly influential U.S. business interests, developed enough of a stake in the policy to invest scarce political capital to defend it from Trump.
During the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump promised conservative Cuban Americans that he would dismantle Obama’s policy. On June 16, 2017, he repudiated normalization and resuscitated regime change, telling a cheering crowd in Miami, “Effective immediately, I am canceling the last administration’s completely one-sided deal with Cuba.” New regulations restricted travel, imposed limits on remittances, and blocked business with Cuban companies managed by the military, including most hotels. The diplomatic working groups on issues of mutual interest were disbanded.
That fall, after several staff members at the U.S. Embassy in Cuba reported mysterious neurological symptoms (later dubbed Havana Syndrome), the State Department cut staffing to a skeleton crew and expelled most of the personnel at the Cuban Embassy in Washington. That limited diplomatic engagement to the bare minimum and halted visa processing, effectively ending cultural and educational exchanges.
In 2019, National Security Advisor John Bolton spearheaded a “maximum pressure” policy to cut off all foreign-exchange flows into Cuba. The administration eliminated people-to-people educational travel, prohibited visitors from staying in most hotels, and drastically cut air service. It disrupted Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba by sanctioning the carriers and pressured Latin American countries to end their medical service contracts with Cuba. Trump activated Title III of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act to deter foreign investors by threatening them with litigation in U.S. courts for profiting from nationalized property.
In its final months, the Trump administration limited family remittances from Cuban Americans and then forced Western Union to stop wiring remittances to the island. In a parting shot, just weeks before Biden’s inauguration, Trump put Cuba back on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of international terrorism, crippling Cuba’s ability to engage in international financial activity.
Together, these measures constituted the most severe sanctions since the embargo was imposed in the 1960s and cost the Cuban economy billions of dollars annually. Then came the COVID-19 pandemic. Beset by the structural problems typical of centrally planned economies and weakened by U.S. sanctions, the Cuban economy was like a patient with preexisting conditions. The tourism industry was closed for almost two years, with lost revenue of more than $6 billion. Family visits stopped, closing off the principal remaining channel for remittances, which fell from an estimated $3.7 billion in 2019 to $2.4 billion in 2020 and $1.1 billion in 2021. By the time Trump left office, Cuba was in crisis and few traces of Obama’s engagement policy remained.
Biden’s Half-Measures
Biden’s election in 2020 seemed to promise some relief. During the campaign, he criticized the impact of Trump’s policies on Cuban families and promised to restore Obama’s policy of normalization “in large part.” But he never did. Domestic politics played a role, as it so often has in Cuba policy. Biden’s first chief of staff, Ron Klain, was a veteran of Al Gore’s narrow defeat in the 2000 presidential election, after Clinton returned 6-year-old Elián González to his father in Cuba. That ignited a firestorm in Miami’s Cuban American community and cost Gore the presidency. To Klain, Cuba remained the third rail of Florida politics. Biden’s personal style also played a role. On contentious issues, he liked to consult with former Senate colleagues. On Cuba, that was Menendez, who was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and also a fierce opponent of any engagement—his swing vote in the divided Senate was essential for Biden’s broader legislative agenda.
Under pressure from Latin America, Biden did offer some half-measures to forestall a boycott of the ninth Summit of the Americas in 2022. He eliminated limitations on remittances and partially restored people-to-people travel but kept the prohibition on staying in government hotels. After a two-year delay, he approved regulatory changes to help Cuba’s emerging private sector but left in place financial restrictions limiting its ability to take advantage of the new rules. Most importantly, he left Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, even though Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted publicly, and Biden himself admitted privately, that it did not belong there.
The result has been an incoherent hybrid policy, with elements of engagement grafted onto Trump’s policy of regime change. As Biden’s era ends, there is little indication that he will use his lame-duck period to finally keep the Cuba-policy promises he made in 2020.
Trump Redux
Trump’s return to the White House could presage a return to maximum pressure, especially with Rubio as secretary of states and Rep. Mike Waltz as national security advisor. Rubio and Republican Cuban Americans on the Hill will surely push for it, just as they did in Trump’s first term. They will point out that 70 percent of Cuban Americans in Florida voted for him and that a recent Florida International University (FIU) poll found 72 percent of Cuban American respondents support maximum pressure to promote regime change.
But resuming maximum pressure would stir a political hornet’s nest. After eight years of intense sanctions exacerbated by the Cuban government’s policy mistakes, the island is suffering an unprecedented economic and social crisis. Life is so hard and prospects for the future are so grim that more than a million Cubans—9 percent of the population—emigrated in the past three years. Three-quarters of them have come to the United States, 690,000 arrived undocumented at the southern border, another 100,000 admitted under Biden’s humanitarian parole program. If Trump adopts policies that deepen Cuba’s crisis, the new surge of migrants could dwarf these numbers, which would seriously complicate his plans to end irregular immigration.
Cuban Americans are not likely to support closing the southern border to Cuban migrants, and immigration law prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality. If the administration tries to make an exception for Cubans, the policy will certainly be challenged in court. Trump’s plans to deport undocumented immigrants could face even bigger problems. Tearing recent Cuban migrants from their families, many of whom paid traffickers thousands of dollars to bring their relatives here, would cause a political firestorm in south Florida. The FIU poll found that 72 percent of respondents support humanitarian parole for Cuban migrants and that half are planning to bring relatives still in Cuba to the United States in the future.
In foreign policy, tougher Cuba sanctions would complicate relations with Mexico. President Claudia Sheinbaum is supporting Cuba by sending it cheap oil. In 2023, her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, warned the Biden administration that Cuban migration spurred by U.S. sanctions was causing problems for Mexico and complicating cooperation with Washington on migration issues. Cooperation with Mexico, as Trump learned in his first term, is indispensable for limiting undocumented migration and narcotics trafficking across the southern border, which are all top priorities for him.
Escalating sanctions on Cuba could also complicate Trump’s desire to improve relations with Russia. Moscow has grown closer with Havana in recent years, expanding relations beyond economic cooperation into a “strategic partnership,” as the two countries describe it. Cuba has defended Russia’s rationale for its invasion of Ukraine, making Havana a valuable ally in the Global South. And Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly values having an outpost in the United States “near abroad,” if only as a geopolitical thorn in Washington’s side. In short, Russia has a clear interest in the survival of the Cuban regime.
If sanctions succeed in destabilizing Cuba to the point that the state fails and social violence erupts, the pressure from Cuban Americans for U.S. military intervention will be immense. Cuban American elected officials demanded intervention in July 2021, in response to the Cuban government’s suppression of nationwide demonstrations, even though the largely peaceful protests only lasted a few days. U.S. intervention would poison relations with Latin America for a generation.
Trump is notoriously transactional. He promised Cuban Americans he would be tough on Cuba if they voted for him and they did, in near record numbers. But Trump is also notoriously self-interested, so if a policy of tightening the screws on Cuba will cause him major headaches in carrying out his immigration policy—the centerpiece of his electoral appeal—he might opt to do nothing or even look for alternatives that involve some level of engagement. Sending food and medicine as humanitarian assistance channeled through the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Catholic Church’s Caritas would reduce migration pressure without directly benefiting the government. Authorizing measures to facilitate the development of Cuba’s private sector, which Trump claimed to support during his first term, would do the same.
Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez predicted that normalizing U.S.-Cuban relations would be a “complex and certainly long process,” when he spoke at the ceremony reopening the Cuban Embassy in Washington in 2015. “The challenge is huge because there have never been normal relations between the United States of America and Cuba,” he said. Clearly, he was right.
Historic and successful as it was, the Obama-Castro détente proved to be easily reversed by political forces in Washington more comfortable with the hostility and conflict of the past than with the future promise of constructive engagement and coexistence.
But the key lesson from the fleeting rapprochement that began 10 years ago on Dec. 17, 2014, is that engagement benefits both countries and that bold and determined leaders can make it happen. The enthusiasm with which Cubans, Americans, and people around the world embraced the prospect of peace between the United States and Cuba underscored just how long overdue reconciliation was. Both Obama and Raúl Castro spoke of rebuilding bridges between their countries, and both acknowledged it would be hard to put decades of animosity to rest. It has proven harder than anyone expected in the halcyon days following Dec. 17, but the ties that bind Cuba and the United States—ties of family, commerce, culture, and the shared interests that come from living next door to one another—will eventually overcome the resistance of even the most recalcitrant politicians. As Henry Kissinger recognized half a century ago, “perpetual antagonism” between the United States and Cuba need not be normal.
Portable Postsocialisms: New Cuban Mediascapes after the End of History (Review)
Paloma Duong's book explores Cuba's changing media landscape's effect on local and global perceptions of the country by analyzing popular Cuban music and recent leftist travel literature on Cuba.
Andrés Pertierra
December 13, 2024
Portable Postsocialisms: New Cuban Mediascapes after the End of History. (University of Texas Press, 2024)
This summer, while walking the streets of Havana, I saw an old man selling a jumble of books that he had haphazardly organized on the sidewalk. One in particular caught my eye, a yellowing hardcover Spanish language edition of Boris Pasternak’s classic dissident novel Doctor Zhivago. This book would have once been something Cubans would have kept secreted away in private libraries and only accessible by borrowing a copy from a friend. Today, its critique is so banal compared to the openly subversive media that everyday Cubans regularly consume through social media, that the only remarkable thing about the sale of Doctor Zhivago is how unremarkable it is. Thirty years ago, in the classic film Fresa y Chocolate (1993), private libraries with banned books were such a social fixture that they served as the inciting incident for the story. Today they are as much historical relics as the USSR itself.
In it, she invites us to reflect on how these changes have affected both foreigners’ perception of the island itself and Cubans’ perception of their country and the wider world.This strange new Cuban media landscape, or “mediascape,” is the subject of media studies scholar Paloma Duong’s latest book Portable Postsocialisms: New Cuban Mediascapes after the End of History. In it, she invites us to reflect on how these changes have affected both foreigners’ perception of the island itself and Cubans’ perception of their country and the wider world. The book is as much a reflection on the how as the what of media consumption in Cuba, tracing what some scholars have termed Cuba’s "digital revolution" over the past thirty years, as millions of Cubans began to access digital media, first via sneaker nets like El Paquete to the explosive growth of mass internet access at relatively accessible prices over the past half decade.
Cubans were catapulted in little more than a decade from one of the most cut-off media audiences in the world to one as interconnected with the new global media culture as any other. In fact, given how widespread internet access is in Cuba, its residents are arguably more connected than many. The impact of the hit song “Patria y Vida,” a political song that challenged the government slogan of “fatherland or death” with “fatherland and life,” or the livestreaming of the explosive protests in 2021 illustrate the transformations we are seeing across Cuba’s media landscape, have already had massive consequences for the political life in the country—a shift that is likely to only become more marked with time.
The titular concept of “postsocialism’” for Duong, does not simply mean “what comes after socialism” but the complexities of life in societies that are trapped somewhere between the statist socialist models of the twentieth century and the marketization that has come to define the post-Cold War realities of even those states that continue to claim to be socialist. Cuba remains an ideological Mecca for political pilgrims who see it as a mirror through which to reimagine the post-capitalist futures of their own countries. But the island’s own political imaginary and media landscape are increasingly dominated by the same media of the capitalist world, especially the United States media, as in any country in Latin America. Even Cuba’s economy—nominally still socialist—is a hodgepodge of private enterprises and a for-profit military conglomerate, GAE S.A., which is run along capitalist lines but also uses the power of the state to enforce various monopolies and privileges to make it as profitable as possible. The era of the nigh total monopoly on media inaugurated after the 1959 Cuban Revolution is a shadow of its former self, as the “digital revolution” has fundamentally reshaped the country’s media landscape and, through it, its political imagination.
Portable Postsocialisms contains four short chapters on different aspects of Cuba’s changing post-Cold War mediascape. The first is an incisive critique of the evolving genre of leftist travel literature on Cuba as the island has transformed from a symbol of a socialist future to a place one has to visit “before it changes.” Duong explores how leftist political tourism to the island now fits in with the increasing marketization of the island’s economy with its role as a place of political pilgrimage, from an “exportable” model to a “portable” and “consumable but contained” product. The critique of this genre of leftist writing on Cuba is far from new, but given the present media revolution, fresh analysis is warranted.
The book’s second chapter focuses on the evolving sounds and music of Cuba and how even “subversive” music, like rock group Porno para Ricardo or, more recently, the collaborative hit “Patria y Vida,” have managed to make big impressions in Cuban culture despite state censorship and repression. The chapter describes a new Cuban reality where state media has broken down but does so without really digging into the policymaking, institutional reshuffling, or logistical details of how this has been made possible, except in passing and using publicly available sources and secondary literature. Much of the chapter is self-ethnographic, and its main focus is more on dissecting the discursive meaning in these songs rather than getting into the material factors that permit this new reality to take shape, a subject addressed in chapters three and four.
These final chapters are perhaps the book's most interesting contributions because they focus on the changing material realities that permit Cubans access to the broader digital world which escapes the media confines imposed on them by the state. Both explore the specifics of the evolving mechanisms by which information and media is exchanged, how varying degrees of state censorship (especially against the since—banned El Paquete) continue to shape and restrict what is easily available, and how we are witnessing a major expansion of consumer culture in Cuba. These are what will likely be the most helpful chapters for non-Cubanists interested in understanding the material basis for this transforming media culture. For example, how digital devices and the internet allowed the viral hit song Patria y Vida to become something nearly everyone in Cuba has heard multiple times, either intentionally or—because the bus driver or someone in the street was blasting it—unintentionally.
While Portable Postsocialisms offers fascinating analysis, the book’s methodology leads to some limitations. As with much media studies scholarship, this book is primarily built on cultural critique, self-ethnography, and secondary literature, which allows her to critique existing literature but prevents her from significantly adding to it.
Instead, she focuses on the admittedly quite frustrating phenomenon of foreigners racing to see Cuba “before it changes.”For example, Duong’s criticism of leftist travelers to the island might have been enhanced by combining a systematic study of these classic texts and the substantial secondary literature. For example, Duong could have referenced the way that Peak Oil activists in the 2000s popularized the myth of a food self-sufficient and ecologically sustainable Cuba or how projects like the new Tricontinental, funded by a Chinese millionaire, push a Marcyite line on Cuba to their followers. This approach would have been entirely in line with the author’s broader criticisms of the leftist travel literature on Cuba, which has consistently been more about using the island as a mirror for reimagining their own anti-capitalist futures at home than the island’s more complex realities. Instead, she focuses on the admittedly quite frustrating phenomenon of foreigners racing to see Cuba “before it changes.” While this genre of leftist travel writing on Cuba common during the 2010s is certainly irritating, it seems far less influential than the true intellectual descendants of the Cold War political pilgrims like Susan Songtag, who today would be Vijay Prashad or Manolo de los Santos.
The ways in which Cubans can now contest these romanticized discourses about Cuba is also a major shift that would have benefited from significantly more attention. Similarly, her analysis of the power of music in chapter two might have been stronger if she had combined her discursive analysis of the songs’ lyrics with analysis of the political economy behind Cuba’s new forms of unofficial cultural dissemination.
It is difficult not to come away from this book feeling conflicted. On the one hand, the book’s topic is a critical one for understanding Cuba’s evolving political landscape, necessarily shaped by its evolving mediascape. Duong offers not only insightful criticisms of various existing literature, such as the ubiquitous leftist travelogue genre but also tangible explanations of how the shifting mediascape is experienced in real life. For her field, the focus on self-ethnography is also entirely normal and thus not a major issue within her discipline. However, this methodological decision has come with significant costs to the book’s ability to speak to other disciplines and wider readership who would benefit from a more archivally based or systematic approach to the topic. This does not prevent the book from being helpful to readers entirely on its own terms, but it does limit the degree to which it can help inform a wider audience.
Andrés Pertierra is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in Latin American & Caribbean History. He has appeared as an analyst on outlets such as BBC, DW, Reuters, Financial Times, and others. His research focuses on late Cold War and post-Cold War Cuban history.
多數美國情報部門否認「哈瓦那綜合症」與美國對手之間存在聯繫2025/1/1
塞爾丁
負責調查數百名官員接二連三地罹患腦損傷和其他嚴重健康疾病的美國情報機構仍然不相信這些疾病與外國對手的行為有關。
星期五(1月10日)發布的一份美國政府稱之為異常健康事件(AHI)的最新情報評估報告稱，健康癥狀由外國行為者或武器所致的可能性「非常不可能」。
這一結論得到了負責調查這種俗稱「哈瓦那綜合症」的疾病的七個美國情報機構中的五個的認可，與2023年的評估結果相符。那項評估發現，癥狀「可能是不涉及外國對手的因素造成的，例如既往疾病、常規疾病和環境因素。」
他們表示，被官員們稱為性質「敏感」的新信息，只會進一步支持2023年的調查結果。
「情報沒有將外國行為者與這些事件聯繫起來。事實上，它指向有他們參与相反的方向，」一位要求不透露姓名的美國情報官員向記者介紹了最新調查結果。
「所有情報界(IC)的組成部門都同意，多年的歷史收集、定位和分析工作並沒有得出令人信服的情報報告，將外國行為者與任何被報告為可能的AHI的特定事件聯繫起來，」這位官員補充道。
然而，新的評估與12月份眾議院情報小組委員會的報告形成了鮮明對比。該報告指責美國情報機構的偵查手段不嚴謹，試圖「得出政治上可接受的結論」。
「有可靠的證據表明，一些異常健康事件是外國對手所為，」眾議院中央情報局小組委員會主席、共和黨人里克·克勞福德(Rick Crawford)當時表示。
麥可招牌《戰慄》舞攻古巴 74歲大師帶芭蕾生一起跳2025/01/09
【劉以安／綜合外電報導】「流行天王」麥可傑克遜(Michael Jackson)離世15年餘精神不死，元月8日他名作《戰慄Thriller》的編舞家——74歲文生帕特森（Vicent Parterson）在古巴首都哈瓦那，率一票芭蕾舞孃重現MV「群魔齊舞」景象，大師還跳得動，精準不漏拍。
文生帕特森 (藍衣者) 在大師班教古巴的芭蕾小妹妹跳《戰慄》舞。法新社／左為麥可傑克遜在《戰慄》MV中的造型
翻開文生帕特森的履歷，滿目豐功偉業。麥可家喻戶曉的MV《閃邊 Beat It》中有兩人械鬥名場面「一言不合就尬舞」，其中一人就是當年33歲的帕特森。麥可的《狡猾罪犯 Smooth Criminal》、《你給我的感覺 The Way You Make Me Feel》、《黑或白 Black or White》和《血濺舞池 Blood on the Dance Floor》，協力編舞都有算帕特森一份。
麥可（紅衣者）在《Beat It》中勸帕特森（右）要打就去練舞室打。畫面截自MV
他也是瑪丹娜（Madonna）的御用導演，娜有名「甜筒罩杯馬甲」的金髮雄心巡迴演唱會（Blond Ambition Tour），正是由他執導。1990年瑪丹娜在MTV音樂錄影帶大獎典禮上表演法國宮廷瑪麗安東妮版《風尚Vogue》，也是出自帕特森的手筆（詳見影片）。
第一次來到古巴
帕特森此次受「芭蕾不設限」（Ballet Beyond Borders）組織邀請在哈瓦那開大師班，這項活動由古巴「利茲特阿方索」（Lizt Alfonso）舞團和美國洛磯山芭蕾舞劇團合辦。他受訪時顯得很興奮，跳針講古巴：「很高興看見到古巴的新舞者，期待遇到更多古巴人，這是我第一次來古巴，也是我第一天在古巴。」
教廷斡旋美國認錯 不再認定古巴是恐怖主義國家 古巴釋囚553人2025/1/15
(原標題)拜登將古巴移出資助恐怖主義國家名單 廢除交流限制2025/1/15
（中央社記者石秀娟華盛頓14日專電）白宮官員今天指出，美國總統拜登決定把古巴移出「資助恐怖主義國家」名單，這是教廷與古巴正在協議的部分內容，以促成古巴釋放多名政治犯。白宮並廢除川普首任期間實施的兩國交流限制。
一名白宮資深官員今天稍早向媒體指出，拜登（Joe Biden）決定不再認定古巴為「資助恐怖主義國家」（a state sponsor of terrorism），因為教廷正與古巴協商一項協議，古巴將釋放相當多名遭不公拘留的政治犯。
路透社報導，白宮釋出消息數小時後，古巴總統狄亞士─卡奈（Miguel Diaz-Canel）表示，古巴政府與梵蒂岡會談，並將陸續釋放553名囚犯。
古巴總統狄亞士─卡奈。（路透社）
根據美國國務院的資料，美國將古巴、北韓、伊朗、敘利亞列為「資助恐怖主義國家」。古巴是在2021年1月12日被列入，當時是美國總統當選人川普（Donald Trump）第一任期（2017至2021年）即將卸任前。
白宮官員今天指出，經過評估，沒有資訊顯示古巴有資助恐怖主義的行為。
被美國認定為資助恐怖主義國家，代表美國可不對其提供援助、禁止出口或銷售武器、實施金融制裁，也可制裁與這些國家有貿易往來的個人或國家。
白宮發言人尚皮耶（Karine Jean-Pierre）今天指出，白宮已經通知國會，將古巴移出「資助恐怖主義國家」名單，也同時通知國會，赫姆斯柏頓法案（Helms-Burton Act）第3條將暫停適用6個月。白宮並撤銷2017年「關於古巴政策的國家安全總統備忘錄第5號」規範美國與古巴交流的多項限制。
根據赫姆斯柏頓法案第3條，古巴裔美國人若有財產在1959年古巴革命後被徵收，得以向美國法院對該財產的現行持有者提告。
該條文爭議性高，美國法院的判決雖無法在古巴執行，仍可能讓外資對古巴投資卻步，自1996年通過後，均遭行政部門擱置，直到2019年川普任內才實施。
「關於古巴政策的國家安全總統備忘錄」第5號也是在川普第一任頒布，包含一系列限制美國與古巴經濟、旅遊往來的措施、貿易禁運等強硬政策。這個備忘錄大幅逆轉川普前任總統歐巴馬（Barack Obama）推動兩國關係正常化的措施。
尚皮耶指出，教宗與許多拉丁美洲的領袖建議拜登採取這些做法，以利增進古巴的人權。「我們採取這些措施，是為了感謝天主教廷努力促使古巴採取建設性行動，以恢復其公民的自由，並創造改善古巴人民生活條件的環境。」
拜登11日與教宗方濟各（Pope Francis）以電話通話，拜登授予教宗總統自由勳章特別獎（Presidential Medal of Freedom with Distinction）。白宮官員指出，教宗在電話中向拜登表達，他對於對話的進展深具信心。（編輯：陳慧萍）1140115
古巴外交部聲明：美國國務院將古巴從「恐怖主義資助國家」名單中移除 2025/1/14
哈瓦那
2025年1月14日，美國政府宣佈了以下決定：1）將古巴從美國國務院所謂的“恐怖主義資助國家”名單中移除；2）利用總統特權，防止美國法院對依據《赫爾姆斯-伯頓法》 (the Helms-Burton Act)第三條提起的訴訟採取行動；3）取消對古巴實體的限制名單，該名單列出一些美國公民和機構，
禁止他們與古巴機構進行金融交易，該禁令並且影響第三國。
儘管這一決定的性質有限，但它是朝著正確方向邁出的步伐，符合古巴政府和人民的持續而堅決的要求，符合拉丁美洲和加勒比地區許多政府的廣泛、明確和反復的呼籲，也符合海外古巴人、政治、宗教和社會組織，以及美國和其他國家眾多政治人物的廣泛呼聲。古巴政府感謝所有人的貢獻和敏感性。
這一決定結束了某些具體的脅迫性措施，這些措施在內的眾多措施，嚴重損害古巴經濟，對民眾造成了嚴峻影響。
然而，自2017年以來實施的經濟封鎖以及大部分加強封鎖的脅迫性措施，依然存在，也持續壓迫古巴，並且美國早已是長臂管轄，將本國法延伸至境外，違反了國際法和所有古巴人的人權。
舉幾個例子來說，古巴合法進口燃料，依舊遭到美國的非法和侵略性迫害。古巴與其他國家之間合法的國際醫療合作協定，繼續遭到殘酷且荒謬的迫害，威脅數百萬人的健康服務，也限制了古巴公共衛生系統的潛力。與古巴相關的國際金融交易，或任何與古巴相關的國家公民交易，仍然受到禁止和報復。停靠古巴的商船也繼續面臨威脅。
另一方面，所有美國公民、公司和美國企業的子公司，也都被禁止與古巴或古巴實體進行交易，除非在非常有限且受到嚴格管制的情況下。美國政府的政策繼續肆虐，任何有意與古巴進行貿易或投資的國家國民，都還遭受騷擾、恐嚇和威脅。美國政府還是禁止其公民訪問古巴。
經濟戰爭依然是阻礙古巴經濟發展和恢復的根本障礙，對民眾造成了巨大的社會成本，並繼續成為古巴人往外移民的催化劑。
今天美國宣佈的決定，在非常有限的範圍內糾正了這一殘酷且不公正的政策。這一糾正發生在政府即將更替之際，本應在多年前就作為一種基本的公正行為實施，不應要求回報，也不應捏造藉口來為不作為辯解。如果希望採取正確行動，僅僅承認事實——古巴完全沒有成為“恐怖主義資助國家”的理由，以及我們國家在反恐鬥爭中的示範性表現，足以將古巴從這一任意的名單中移除，這一點甚至已經得到了美國政府機構的承認。
眾所周知，未來該國政府可能會像以前一樣逆轉今天採取的措施，正如其對古巴的行為缺乏合法性、道德性、一致性和理性一樣。
因此，美國政客通常不會停止尋找藉口，只要1960年時美國國務卿助理·馬婁裡 Lester Mallory所描述的目標不變。他說，通過經濟封鎖、貧困、饑餓和絕望來征服古巴人民。如果美國繼續不肯承認並接受古巴自決的權利，如果美國執意承受因其對古巴的經濟窒息政策所造成的國際孤立之政治成本，白宮就不會停止尋找藉口。
古巴將繼續對抗並譴責這一經濟戰爭政策、干涉計畫，也不中斷地抗議美國聯邦政府每年編列預算，公然資助反古巴的資訊和抹黑行動。儘管存在分歧，古巴仍然願意與美國建立尊重的關係，基於對話和不干涉兩國內政的原則。
盧比奧：古巴境內設立兩個外國間諜站，符合資助恐怖主義國家條件2025/1/16
被特朗普提名為美國國務卿的盧比奧認為古巴應列入“資助恐怖主義國家”名單，並暗示他將推翻現任總統拜登前一天下令移出名單的決定。
法新社報道，盧比奧指出：是古巴政權不只允許1個國家，而是允許2個國家在他們境內設置間諜站，距離美國海岸僅90英里（145公里）。
盧比奧說，我毫無疑問地認為，他們完全符合被列為資助恐怖主義國家的所有條件，並稱20日上任的特朗普政府不受拜登政策所約束。
美國白宮星期二才釋出消息指，美國總統拜登決定把古巴移出資助恐怖主義國家名單，但盧比奧第二天就表示反對，並暗示他將推翻這項決定。
盧比奧出身古巴移民後裔，並且強烈反對已故古巴強人卡斯特羅1959年主導的革命。
韓駐古巴大使館 正式開幕2025/1/18
古巴於1949年曾認可南韓地位，直至當地1959年爆發社會主義革命後，兩國中斷外交往來。當成為共產主義國家後，古巴獲稱為「北韓的兄弟國家」，自此未曾與南韓正式建立外交關係。直至去年2月14日，南韓與古巴在美國紐約交換外交文件，雙方正式建立外交關係。南韓外交部中南美局長李柱一和古巴外交部雙邊總司長佩雷拉等官員出席開館儀式，韓方期待駐古巴大使館開館能夠推動兩國民眾交流合作發展，為到訪或居留當地的南韓公民提供領事服務，保護旅古韓僑。
https://hk.on.cc/hk/bkn/cnt/intnews/20250118/bkn-20250118150218222-0118_00992_001.html
http://www.CRNTT.com
中評社北京1月20日電／據新華網報導，“中國將作為主賓國參加今年的古巴國際旅遊博覽會。”1月16日，古巴駐華大使白詩德在新華社愉快地分享了這一好消息。
從在國際形勢風雲變幻中風雨同舟、堅定相互支持，到如今現代農業、可再生能源、信息技術、生物技術等領域合作全面發展，中國和古巴的交流合作歷經歲月洗禮，不斷拓展深化，開辟出光明前景。
用白詩德的話說：“古中未來會有更多甜蜜故事。”
1月16日，白詩德一行來到新華通訊社參訪。穿過新立方智能化演播室的“時空隧道”，白詩德“置身”瑞金、延安，體會新華社建社94年來篳路藍縷之艱；駐足新華社大數據中心的屏幕前，白詩德詳細瞭解新聞生產流程，不時問詢大數據分析細節，感受新技術帶來的澎湃動力。
中國和古巴同為社會主義國家，是好朋友、好同志、好兄弟。1959年，新華社哈瓦那分社成立，是新華社在拉美國家建立的第一個分社。
“在古中兩國發展進程中的每一個重要時刻，新華社記者從不缺席。”白詩德說，新華社在世界範圍內影響力持續擴大，在報導中始終堅持客觀原則，全方位、多角度報導各國特別是全球南方國家的發展變化，成為代表全球南方國家輿論的響亮聲音。
“海內存知己，天涯若比鄰。古巴和中國為不同大小國家之間、社會主義國家之間、中國和拉美國家之間如何相處樹立了典範。”白詩德說。
白詩德2011年至今兩次擔任駐華大使，見證了新時代中國的發展變遷。他表示，在中國共產黨堅強領導下，中國走出了一條符合自身國情的成功發展道路。堅持以人民為中心、全面深化改革、推動高質量發展等一系列理念和舉措，體現了中國共產黨的守正和創新，為世界各國提供了重要參考和借鑒。
白詩德表示，共建“一帶一路”倡議和三大全球倡議為世界注入了穩定的正能量。他十分贊成構建人類命運共同體理念，認為“同球共濟”才是全人類戰勝共同挑戰、實現包容發展的正確道路。
“新華社和古巴媒體智庫加強交流合作，傳遞古中友好聲音，增進兩國人民相互瞭解和友誼，這無疑是古中命運共同體建設的重要方面。”白詩德說。
古巴日推三種模因幣 首批市值3000 萬美元2025/1/21
來源 Cryptopolitan
據報道，今天發生了一系列令人震驚的事件，古巴在 24 小時內推出了不止一個，而是三個 memecoin。不久之後，每一枚硬幣都被“拉扯”了。開發商突然放棄了 meme 項目，並撤回了這三種代幣的所有流動性，導致其價值暴跌。這些騙局引起了加密行業的注意，凸顯了模因幣行業的風險。這三種代幣遵循相似的模式：推出、推廣、獲得trac，然後崎嶇不平，使投資者在這三種情況下都感到茫然。
通過各種 X 帖子記錄的事件讓用戶表達了懷疑和沮喪。根據Anti Rug Agent平臺的數據，CUBA的安全得分爲41.56%，最高的個人持有者擁有該代幣總供應量的近4.2%。雖然鑄幣被鎖定，但該項目在啓動 5 小時後擁有超過 14,000 個錢包。前十大持有者擁有該代幣供應量的約 20%，價值 170 萬美元，LP 銷燬情況仍未知。截至發佈時，所有供應的 CUBA 代幣總價值約爲 840 萬美元。
CUBA 的騙局是在古巴認識並監管加密貨幣多年之後出現的，這主要是由於美國的禁運限制了傳統的金融互動。加密貨幣使用一直呈上升趨勢，用例範圍從匯款到在線購物和本地交易。然而，實際滲透到每個古巴公民的日常生活中仍然受到技術文盲和很少訪問互聯網的限制
古巴粗獷的模因幣留下了慘痛的教訓
這三種模因幣的快速上漲和下跌對高風險、高回報模因幣領域的加密貨幣投資者來說是一個警示，在這種情況下，快速收益的誘惑往往掩蓋了盡職調查。今天的欺騙性事件導致人們呼籲採取嚴格的監管和監督來保護投資者。
從“Cancillería de Cuba”X 帳戶刪除的推文給相關人員留下了一系列慘痛的教訓。大多數推文共同描繪了一幅協調努力的畫面，以利用圍繞國家主題模因硬幣的炒作。
儘管發生了不幸的事態發展，古巴承認和監管加密貨幣的舉措代表了一項重大轉變，旨在融入全球加密經濟，同時應對當地金融體系的挑戰。 CUBA 的騙局暴露了類似加密項目對這個島國的潛在影響。
CUBA 的推出被視爲在一個國際制裁阻礙傳統銀行業務的國家促進關鍵金融服務的努力。古巴中央銀行正在建立加密貨幣監管框架，旨在打擊洗錢和欺詐，同時推動創新。一位 X 用戶指出Solana進入了加密貨幣領域，但這種興奮是短暫的。
川普再將古巴列入恐怖主義國家名單 古巴總統強烈譴責 2025/1/21
李欣潔／核稿編輯〔即時新聞／綜合報導〕美國總統川普（Donald Trump）宣布將古巴重新列入美國恐怖主義國家贊助者名單，此舉立即引發古巴政府強烈反彈，古巴總統卡內爾（Miguel Díaz-Canel）也在社群平台X發文痛批川普此舉「傲慢且無視事實」。
綜合外媒報導，古巴總統卡內爾在社群平台X上發文，批評川普此舉「傲慢且無視事實」。他表示，此決定的目的是加強對古巴的經濟制裁，將嚴重影響古巴人民的生活。
古巴外交部長羅德里格斯（Bruno Rodriguez）也對此表達強烈不滿。他在社群平台X上指出，川普「傲慢自大」且「明知在撒謊」。羅德里格斯強調，雖然這項決定會對古巴造成傷害，但不會動搖古巴人民的決心。
據了解，川普政府此次將古巴列入恐怖主義國家贊助者名單的理由，源自美國前國務卿龐皮歐（Mike Pompeo）在2021年的指控。龐皮歐當時表示，古巴為國際恐怖主義行為提供支持，並向恐怖份子提供安全港，因為古巴拒絕引渡在哈瓦那進行和平談判的哥倫比亞游擊組織領導人。
目前，被美國列入恐怖主義國家贊助者名單的國家僅有4個，除古巴外，還包括北韓、伊朗和敘利亞。古巴官員一直呼籲將該國從名單中移除，認為這項制裁加上美國實施60多年的禁運，已嚴重影響該國經濟。
值得注意的是，拜登政府已於1月14日宣布計畫將古巴從恐怖主義國家贊助者名單中移除。古巴總統卡內爾指出，川普實施的極端經濟封鎖措施不僅導致古巴物資短缺，還顯著增加了從古巴到美國的移民潮。
古巴總統卡內爾在社群平台X上發文，批評川普此舉「傲慢且無視事實」。（法新社）
古巴外交部長羅德里格斯也對此表達強烈不滿。他在X上指出，川普「傲慢自大」且「明知在撒謊」。（法新社）
中方斥美國以單邊名單對古巴濫施制裁 暴露霸凌面目 2025/1/21
特朗普重返白宮，簽署行政命令，再次將古巴列入「支持恐怖主義國家」名單。古巴國家主席迪亞斯卡內爾回應說，這並不令人驚訝，目的是進一步加強針對古巴的殘酷經濟戰爭。在北京，外交部批評，美國的單邊名單和脅迫機制毫無信譽，充分暴露了美國霸權、霸道、霸凌的面目，敦促美方多做有利於美古關係改善、西半球和平穩定的事。
外交部發言人郭嘉昆說：「正如迪亞斯卡內爾主席指出的，美國新政府恢復了將古巴列為支恐國家名單的欺騙性做法，其目的是繼續加強對古巴的殘酷經濟戰爭，以達到統治古巴的目的。這一做法表明，美國的單邊名單和脅迫機制毫無信譽，反覆利用所謂支恐國家名單，對古巴濫施單邊制裁，違背事實、毫無根據，充分暴露了美國霸權、霸道、霸凌的面目。幾天時間裡如兒戲般將古巴移出、移進所謂名單，試問國家信譽何在？國際信義何在？」
郭嘉昆指：「美國對古巴實施60多年全面封鎖，嚴重違背國際法和國際關係基本準則，對古巴人民經濟、民生造成深重災難。中方一貫反對美方打著自由、民主、反恐的旗號干涉古巴內政，再次敦促美國盡早取消對古巴的全面封鎖，切實將古巴從支恐國家名單中移除，多做有利於美古關係改善、西半球和平穩定的事。」
美計畫北木行動嫁禍古巴？川普要求解密 「誰殺甘迺迪」有望真相大白2025/1/28
黃貞怡2025年1月28日美國60年代曾想要發起嫁禍給古巴的假旗行動？時任總統甘迺迪被暗殺跟拒絕該計畫有關嗎？一份由美國參謀首長聯席會議（JCS）在1962年簽署的12頁報告，詳細描述了一項在1960年代美國曾計劃自導自演恐怖攻擊，嫁禍古巴，以爭取美國人支持入侵古巴，推翻當時的古巴領導人卡斯楚（Fidel Castro）。川普總統承諾將公開所有與甘迺迪遇刺相關的機密文件，究竟是誰了甘迺迪？有望從解密文件中獲得解答。
《每日郵報》報導這個代號為「北木行動」（Operation Northwoods）的絕密陰謀，提議在美國城市實施恐怖主義，即所謂的「假旗行動」，然後將責任歸咎於古巴，以欺騙美國人支持對古巴開戰。報告中寫道：「我們可以在邁阿密地區、佛羅里達州其他城市，甚至在華盛頓特區發動一場古巴共產黨的恐怖運動。」此外，報告還提出了數十個其他暴力想法，以挑起美國人對古巴的敵意。
美國官員甚至提議殺害自己的士兵，報告寫道：「我們可以在關塔那摩灣炸毀一艘美國船隻，並將責任歸咎於古巴」，以及「美國報紙上的傷亡名單將引發一股有助的全國憤怒浪潮。」當這份報告送到時任總統甘迺迪（John F. Kennedy）的辦公桌時，他拒絕了「北木行動」，而後遭到暗殺。甘迺迪遇刺的一個陰謀論聲稱，他是被據稱控制美國「深層政府」的以色列殺害的。
現在川普（Donald Trump）總統已承諾公開所有與甘迺迪遇刺有關的機密文件，這可能會讓更多關於美國政府在1960年代活動被揭露。川普認為「深層政府」是「一個據稱陰影籠罩的團體，無論當選的政府是誰，他們都對政府政策施加過度的影響。」他誓言要「清除沼澤」，並有望針對情報界採取行動，他認為情報界一直在努力阻止他入主白宮，這是「深層政府」行動的一部分。
「北木行動」提案是作為一份名為《美國軍事干預古巴的理由》文件的一部分起草的。這份備忘錄草案集是由國防部（DoD）和參謀首長聯席會議撰寫的，並於1962年提交給時任國防部長羅伯特·麥克納馬拉（Robert McNamara）。但這份文件已在中情局（CIA）圖書館解密。該計劃包括從散布謠言到「讓友好的古巴人穿軍裝在軍事基地上演戲並在設施內炸毀彈藥」等一切內容。清單還包括一項在空軍基地「燒毀飛機」的計劃，以及在未指明的基地港口入口處沉沒一艘船，然後「為假受害者舉行葬禮」。直到2001年外界才知道「北木行動」的存在，當時一份幾乎完整的文件版本在網上發布。
可容納3萬人 川普將擴建關達那摩灣移民拘留設施2025-01-30
余思瑩美國總統川普(Donald Trump) 29日表示，他將下令五角大廈(Pentagon)與國土安全部(Department of Homeland Security, DHS)在關達那摩灣(Guantanamo Bay)準備一個可容納多達3萬移民的拘留設施。
位於古巴關達那摩灣的美國海軍基地原本就有一個移民拘留所，與美國為關押外國恐怖分子嫌犯而設立的高安全級別監獄不同。該拘留所數十年來偶爾使用，包括關押在海上攔截的海地與古巴人。
川普的邊境沙皇霍曼(Thomas Homan)在29日稍晚表示，政府將擴大現有的設施，並由移民暨海關執法局(Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE)負責管理。
川普在白宮表示：「今天我還將簽署一項行政命令，指示國防部和國土安全部開始準備在關達那摩灣設立可容納3萬人的移民設施。」
他說，該設施將被用來「拘留威脅美國人民的最嚴重非法移民罪犯。他們其中一些人罪大惡極，我們甚至無法信任其他國家會關押他們，因為我們不希望他們回來，所以我們要將他們送去關達那摩灣。這將使我們的收容量立刻加倍，對吧？」
川普不久後簽署了一份備忘錄，其中沒有具體的移民人數，但呼籲在擴建的設施「增加拘留空間」。
霍曼29日在與記者談話時表示，該中心將用於關押「最為罪大惡極的人」。
在被問到該設施將需要多少資金時，國土安全部部長諾姆(Kristi Noem)表示，政府正在與國會的預算調和與撥款委員合作解決這個問題。
在2001年9月11日對美國的攻擊事件後，當時的美國總統小布希(George W. Bush)於2002年設立了關達那摩灣的拘留設施，用於拘留外國武裝份子嫌犯。現在監獄裡還剩下15名囚犯。
川普的兩位民主黨前任歐巴馬(Barack Obama)與拜登(Joe Biden)都試圖關閉關達那摩灣監獄，卻只能減少囚犯人數，但川普誓言讓監獄繼續開放。
那摩海軍基地安置被美驅逐移民的決定。
聲明指出，美國正以粗暴方式處理自身在經濟、社會、政府管理和外交政策等方面存在的問題。那些被美國驅逐或即將被驅逐的眾多人員，實際上都是美國政策的受害者。
值得注意的是，美國政府計劃用來安置移民的關塔那摩並非屬於美國，而是古巴關塔那摩省的一部分，一直以來都被美國軍事非法占領，這一占領行為嚴重違背了古巴民族的意願。在國際上，關塔那摩軍事基地被認定為實施酷刑、無限期拘留的場所，它不受美國法院管轄，有許多從未被審判或定罪的人長期被關押於此。古巴方面認為，美國不負責任地將關塔那摩海軍基地設為移民安置點的這一決定，無疑會給該地區帶來危險，造成局勢不穩定，破壞地區穩定局面，進而引發嚴重的後果。
就在同一天，美國總統特朗普表示，將下令國防部和國土安全部，著手在關塔那摩灣籌備可容納3萬人的設施，用於“拘留對美國人民構成威脅的最嚴重的非法移民罪犯”。
Life in Cuba Has Grown Harder. Biden’s Modest Reversal Was Too Little Too Late.
Many fear Trump will reverse Biden’s decision to remove Cuba from the US’s list of “state sponsors of terrorism."
By Tamara Pearson , Truthout
January 15, 2025
On January 14, the Biden administration decided to remove Cuba from the U.S. State Department’s list of alleged “state sponsors of terrorism,” to suspend Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, and to ease a few other financial sanctions on Cuba. These reversed measures were imposed by Donald Trump during his first presidential term as layers added on to the existing blockade, and the Biden government upheld them until now, with just one week to go.
At the same time, but in a separate announcement, Cuba said it would release 553 people “imprisoned for various crimes.” The Cuban government said the measure was part of an ongoing relationship with the Vatican. In talks with the Vatican in 2023, Cuba also stressed the damage caused by the U.S.’s policies toward Cuba.
The U.S.’s inclusion of Cuba on its list of alleged state sponsors of terrorism in early 2021 meant a global restricting of almost any kind of humanitarian aid, business, investment and trade that involved Cuba. Title III of the Helms-Burton Act allowed U.S. citizens to sue any person or entity profiting from property expropriated by the Cuban government during its revolution. Its main impact was limiting foreign investment in Cuba.
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Unfortunately, though a step in the right direction, the Biden administration’s eleventh-hour gesture is unlikely to change the conditions of intense scarcity under which most Cubans currently operate, as the blockade itself remains. Further, given Trump’s opposition to the Cuban government — as well as the vehement opposition expressed by his nominee for secretary of state, Marco Rubio — it is unlikely that this token gesture from Biden will last.
Related Story
Harms of US Blockade Against Cuba Compound as Food and Energy Crises Spread
Having survived the US blockade for 62 years, Cuba is enduring its worst economic crisis since the collapse of the USSR.
Rodrigo Acuña ,
Truthout
April 20, 2024
As I walked around Havana last week, the cumulative impact of over six decades of the blockade was clear. It seemed that everywhere I went people were hard at work trying to fix cars or carts, water trucks or air conditioners, usually without access to the manufacturer’s official replacement parts. And while a culture of repair rather than extreme levels of consumption is a positive thing, key infrastructure like thermal plants have surpassed their lifespan and may be beyond repair, as crucial parts haven’t been obtained due to the blockade.
In October, 187 countries once again voted in the UN General Assembly for an end to the U.S. embargo against Cuba, with just the U.S. and Israel against lifting it, and Moldova abstaining. Aurelie Flore Koumba Pambo, Gabon’s representative to the UN, said the blockade is “harmful to the Cuban people.” The Cuban economy has also been severely impacted by the pandemic, currency reform, and the rise of small businesses or MIPYMES. As Trump is about to be sworn in, Cubans say they are struggling and worried, but also resilient and hopeful.
The Cuban National Ballet performing the Nutcracker Suite.Tamara Pearson
The Oldest Blockade
The U.S. sanctions are complex and include asset freezes, export and import restrictions, travel limitations and financial transaction controls. Most commercial transactions with Cuba are prohibited, and in July 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department also announced additional restrictions blocking Cuba’s access to cryptocurrencies and other digital assets.
An engraving cooperative workshop in Havana, Cuba.Tamara Pearson
The stringency of the blockade means the U.S. can extend its enforcement beyond its borders, though. In March last year, Swiss bank EFG International, for example, paid $3.7 million to settle its supposed civil liability with the U.S. Department of Treasury for processing 873 transactions for clients based in or linked to people in Cuba, in violation of the blockade. Other companies and banks, in fear of such reprisals or penalties from the U.S., refuse to work with Cuba. The Cuban government reports that between March 2022 and February 2023, 130 foreign banks refused to conduct operations with Cuban banks. It says U.S. aggression toward Cuba includes intimidating companies that send it fuel supplies, and attempting to “undermine recovery of the tourism sector” after the pandemic.Trump, in 2017, also interrupted fuel supplies and applied dozens of other sanctions on top of the regular ones, and these measures are still in place. The “state sponsors of terrorism” designation resulted in canceled investments and import and export plans, and that loss of foreign exchange then supercharged inflation in Cuba.
The Price of Eggs and the Cost of Fuel Shortages
Workers in many different sectors of the Cuban economy say they are facing particularly difficult conditions right now – conditions that are unlikely to change due to yesterday’s limited reversals.
Angel Rojas, who works in a grocery shop as well as driving a taxi, shared his reflections during a conversation in Havana over the new year.
Angel RojasTamara Pearson
“Things at the moment are a bit difficult,” Rojas told Truthout. “Speaking as a taxi driver, buying fuel is quite complicated. You have to top up a government card, or you can obtain fuel from the state using Metropolitan Bank cards. Then there’s fuel scarcity.”
Rojas explained that there is a lack of fuel trucks to transport fuel from refineries, on top of fuel scarcity itself. “You have to wait in line for many hours, sometimes two or three days,” he said. “The government has made an app, so you can see which gas stations have supply and of what type of fuel.”
“Likewise, there is some food scarcity. It’s not that you can’t find food, just that it’s scarce and sometimes you have to go to a lot of effort to find something like eggs, or you have to line up. Sometimes you have to travel quite far to get something, but people who don’t have cars, well it’s hard for them buy some things,” he says.
A giant warehouse where individuals paint and sell their art, in Havana, Cuba.Tamara Pearson
Walking around Havana, it’s noticeable how the shortages in public transport affect all aspects of life, with people waiting for hours to hitch a ride, filling buses on the limited routes available, or paying 200 Cuban pesos for collective taxis. While the mostly empty roads are better for the air quality, the transport shortages impact production, goods distribution, mobility, working and socializing. A lot of used vehicles have been donated by other governments but they are old, and with the blockade, repair parts often aren’t available. Improvisation is essential: a kids’ train is currently being used to transport tourists and locals along the capital’s Malecón esplanade.
Deficiencies of one resource trigger disruptions in other sectors. Speaking to Truthout, Virgin Maria de los Reyes Cordoba, who retired after spending 40 years working as a maritime transport technician and is currently working as a secretary to the editor of the Havana Tribune, gave the example of eggs. She noted how farms have been affected by the recent hurricanes, but that poultry farms are also struggling to produce eggs due to the lack of chicken feed. Further, farming products have to be transported around the country, but fuel shortages limit that movement.
Virgen Maria de los ReyesTamara Pearson
An “aging” economy, she said — one that hasn’t been able to update its technology due to the sanctions — “has stopped us from advancing in other areas … we lack so many things, the country has become heavily focused on imports, leaving domestic production somewhat behind.”
“Cuba is having to import sugar, for example, because the old sugar mills are based on old technology and it’s hard to obtain the spare parts to keep them going. … The shipping fleet is another thing that has deteriorated, so now we practically don’t have boats, and that impacts fish supply,” she explained.
Bike taxis, which are perhaps easier to maintain and don’t require fuel, are popular.Tamara Pearson
Lethal Economic Attacks
According to the Cuban government, in its annual report on the blockade, just half an hour of sanctions cause economic damage “equivalent to the cost of the electronic and conventional wheelchairs” required to meet the needs of students in the special education system. “At current prices, the damages accumulated during more than six decades of implementation of this policy, amount to $164 billion” the report notes, with the annual financial damage of the blockade increasing by $190 million from February of 2023 to March of 2024, for a total of $5,056,800,000 that year.
Beyond food, the blockade is affecting life-saving medical treatment. Cuba hasn’t been able to purchase blood gas analyzers from Radiometer for critical patients in intensive care, because the company is part of Danaher Corporation, based in the U.S.
Last year, Cuba needed to buy four cooling machines that are vital for manufacturing medicines, but the European manufacturer canceled its contract for the sale after it was acquired by the U.S. multinational, Trane Technologies. The list goes on.
People lining up for a bus in a main intersection of Havana, Cuba.Tamara Pearson
A lack of medical supplies like cotton and gauze has led to a decline in surgeries, Reuters reports. Current production of some food staples has declined by as much as 80 percent compared to prior to the pandemic, and Cuba can only acquire 40 percent of the fuel, 4 percent of the fertilizer, and 20 percent of the animal feed it needs, according to Reuters.
Nevertheless, the country continues to strive to provide free and preventative health care. I noticed that the policlinics (outpatient care) were always open, and one person told me how, in the lead-up to giving birth, she was visited by nurses every few days.
Recent Increases in Inequality and Shortages
Things have gotten notably more difficult in Cuba over the past four to five years. To help cope, private and state-owned micro, small and medium companies, called MIPYMES (micro, pequeñas y medianas empresas), have been permitted since 2021 and are growing in number. In July 2024, there were 11,044 private MIPYMES and 222 state-owned ones registered, though many small-scale sellers may not be registered.
De los Reyes says a lot of importation now happens through the MIPYMES — typically small family stores — and they are “basically supplying the country … but they sell products at very high prices, and much of the population can’t afford them.”
For example, I bought a small can of sardines for 300 Cuban pesos, while de los Reyes says a doctor typically earns 5,000 Cuban pesos a month. Of course, people with small businesses or working independently tend to earn significantly more than that.
Policlinics like this one in Old Havana are open and available free of charge.Tamara Pearson
The government has implemented other policies in an effort to access more foreign currency and to be able to import. The dual currency system, implemented in 1993 and 1994 to combat the black market in U.S. dollars involved a national peso (CUP) and a convertible peso (CUC) equivalent to the dollar. But it was eliminated in 2021 after MLC (moneda libremente convertible, or freely convertible currency) cards — a virtual currency used in state shops and meant to be equivalent to the dollar — were created in 2019.
Since then, Rojas said, “the national currency has been depreciating.”
“The MLC, based around remittances … was a way for the government to have foreign currency, in order to be able to import fuel, food and parts for repairs,” Rojas told Truthout. “Because the thing is, the MIPYMES use cash, and so they buy things from abroad with foreign currency and sell them here, and the foreign currency … never makes it to the government.” However, he added, the amount of money coming in via the MLC, such as in shops that only accept payments with MLC cards, is very little.
Then, the pandemic in 2020 saw tourism revenue plummeting, and along with the currency reform, some state subsidies and gratuities were eliminated in 2021.
V
egetables for sale in a largely empty street in the Vedado area of Havana, Cuba.Tamara Pearson
“Before 2020, we were happy,” says de los Reyes. “There weren’t these shortages, industry was working, with problems and all, but largely working.” However, she explained that other Global South countries’ economies were also hit hard during the pandemic, and they were no longer able to send as much help to Cuba. Further, a lot of professionals have emigrated, “leaving Cuba without a lot of skilled health and education workers.”
The Cuban government provides families, children under 13, and people over 65 with basic supplies like milk, rice, beans, coffee, cooking oil and sugar. Rojas said sometimes these supplies arrive late, causing his family to receive the previous month’s supply together with the current month’s, but noted that in the end, “we do always get it.” Nevertheless, he said, the monthly staples aren’t usually enough.
Discontent, Worry and Hope for the Future
“Currently, there’s a lot of discontent,” Rojas told Truthout. “A lot of people are very angry at the government because they believe everything is its fault. Many families have been emotionally affected. Our typical ways of being, of solidarity, of helping out a neighbor, sharing out the food we have — even if it isn’t much, is something you see less of now, because families are struggling to be OK.”
A grocery store in Havana, Cuba.Tamara Pearson
He described people sometimes arguing or fighting, “physically or verbally attacking each other over things that aren’t that important” as a result of the stress of the current situation. Also, increasing inequality means one family may have more than another, leading to insecurities and tension in the community. “The unity that there has always been, during celebrations and gatherings, has been negatively impacted,” Rojas said. “It’s sad to see, especially because in the past, when there were issues, people knew how to work them out together.”
The incoming Trump administration could not just undo Biden’s recent reversals, but also increase sanctions and travel restrictions even further.
Rojas said he is worried about what that could mean for fuel and food supplies. “The blockade could be intensified … [Trump] has promised mass deportations … and a lot of Cubans, in order to migrate to the U.S., sold their homes, so now they have nothing here.”
But while the blockade can be demoralizing, many in Cuba are keeping their spirits up through the creative arts. Cuba is thriving with culture. I went to the ballet where tickets are just 150 Cuban pesos, and the National Theater was packed with locals, many of whom walked long distances home afterward due to the lack of transport; and you can go to the baseball stadium for 50 Cuban pesos, the aquarium for around 20 Cuban pesos, and catch the ferry across the canal for 2 Cuban pesos. From small home-based galleries, to a warehouse full of artists and a cooperative engraving workshop, art is everywhere in Cuba, and mundane chain stores are not.
A man with a small, private business selling vegetables.Tamara Pearson
“There’s hope in the unity of people here, and there’s trust in the leadership [of Cuba], because one way or another, they usually manage to weather difficult situations. Us young people are the hope, those of us who stay here,” Rojas said.
“It’s very difficult. But we are managing. One finds a way to stay afloat. Cubans are inventive, creative. We work out a way to get through things,” concluded de los Reyes.
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